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Innovatie is van vitaal belang voor het voortbestaan van organisaties. Maakbedrijven staan 
onder grote druk nieuwe producten te ontwikkelen om aan klantenwensen te blijven voldoen. 
Twee activiteiten zijn hierbij essentieel: exploratie en exploitatie. Exploratie is het nastreven 
van nieuwe kennis en bestaat uit activiteiten die geassocieerd worden met improvisatie, 
experiment, creativiteit en variatie. Exploitatie bouwt verder op bestaande kennis en is gericht 
RS VHOHFWLH LPSOHPHQWDWLH HQ HI¿FLsQWLH 'RRUGDW EHLGH DFWLYLWHLWHQZH]HQOLMN YDQ HONDDU
verschillen, een andere tijdshorizon hebben en wedijveren om dezelfde schaarse middelen, 
bestaat onderling een sterke spanning. Het organiseren van exploratieve en exploitatieve 
innovatieprojecten, en het beïnvloeden van exploratie- en exploitatieniveaus in organisaties, 
zijn daarom een grote uitdaging. 
Dit onderzoek levert een bijdrage aan inzicht in antecedenten van exploratie en exploitatie 
op individueel, team- en organisatieniveau. Het toont dat organisaties in het streven naar 
incrementele en radicale innovatie, het best exploratieve en exploitatieve processen 
verschillend kunnen structureren. Incrementele innovatieprocessen zijn gebaat bij een 
functionele structuur, terwijl radicale innovatieprocessen een cross-functionele aanpak 
behoeven, waarbij verschillende disciplines intensief met elkaar samenwerken. Naast het 
belang van structurele factoren, wijst dit onderzoek op de relevantie van cognitieve factoren 
in het verklaren van innovatieprestatie. Op teamniveau heeft analytisch denken een positieve 
invloed op de prestatie van zowel exploratieve als exploitatieve innovatieprojecten. Intuïtief 
denken is daarentegen alleen van positieve invloed op de prestatie van exploratieve projecten, 
ZDDUQDGUXNOLJWRSFUHDWLYLWHLWHQH[SHULPHQW,QH[SORLWDWLHYHSURMHFWHQZDDUHI¿FLsQWLH
focus en standaardisatie centraal staan, beïnvloedt intuïtief denken projectprestatie juist 
negatief. Exploratieve en exploitatieve processen vragen dus niet alleen om verschillende 
structuren, maar ook om verschillende denkstijlen. Dit onderzoek laat tevens zien hoe 
denkstijlen van topmanagers en het investeren in beide processen aan elkaar zijn gerelateerd. 
De inzichten uit de drie studies op individueel, team- en organisatieniveau komen tot slot 
samen in een verkenning van relaties tussen structurele en cognitieve factoren en hoe zij de 
evolutie van exploratie en exploitatie in een organisatie beïnvloeden.
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
New product development (NPD) is seen as crucial for the long-term survival and growth of the 
firm (Baumol, 2002; Schumpeter, 1939). Many manufacturing companies face intense pressures 
to innovate to meet customer requirements and especially to produce innovations that will draw 
the market spotlight and market share to them (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). Product 
development is critical because new products are becoming the nexus of competition for many 
firms (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Firms whose employees quickly develop exciting products 
that people are anxious to buy are likely to win. In contrast, firms introducing "off-the-mark" 
products are likely to lose. New product development is thus a potential source of competitive 
advantage for many firms (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). New product development is also 
important because it is a critical means by which members of organizations diversify, adapt, and 
even reinvent their firms to match evolving market and technical conditions (e.g. Schoonhoven 
et al., 1990). Thus, new product development is among the essential processes for success, 
survival, and renewal of organizations, particularly for firms in either fast-paced or competitive 
markets. 
 
A central component of success in new product development is the maintenance of a balance of 
exploration  and  exploitation  within  the  firm.  Exploration  can  be  defined  as  “the  pursuit  of  new  
knowledge   of   things   that   might   come   to   be   known”   and   exploitation   as   “the   use   of   and  
development   of   things   already   known”   (Levinthal   and   March,   1993).   A   one-sided focus on 
exploitation may enhance short-term performance, but it can result in a competency trap because 
firms may not be able to respond adequately to environmental changes (Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
Conversely,  too  much  exploration  may  enhance  a  firm’s  ability  to  renew  its  knowledge  base  but  
can trap organizations in an endless cycle of search and unrewarding change (Volberda and 
Lewin, 2003). Therefore, near consensus exists among scholars on the need for balancing both 
types of activities (Gupta et al., 2006). Organizations thus have to continuously reconfigure their 
activities to meet changing demands in the internal and external environments (e.g. Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986; Webb and Pettigrew, 1999). However, organizations encounter various 
challenges in balancing these activities (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Levinthal and March, 1993; 
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Siggelkow and Rivkin,  2006;;  Tushman  and  O’Reilly,  1996)  as  they  entail  inherent  contradictions  
that  need  to  be  managed  (Tushman  and  O’Reilly,  1996).   
 
The first challenge concerns investment in long-term and short-term innovation processes. 
Organizations making conscious choices to support exploration or exploitation activities by 
making resource allocation decisions, face trade-offs between the expected consequences of 
these activities (Lavie et al., 2010). Within a business unit, exploration and exploitation compete 
for scarce organizational resources. More resources devoted to exploitation imply fewer 
resources left over for exploration and vice versa (Gupta et al., 2006). This implies that 
organizations have to decide between short-term productivity and long-term innovation. 
Compared to returns from exploitation, returns from exploration are less certain, more remote in 
time, and more distant from the locus of action (March, 1991). Investing in explorative activities 
therefore involves higher risk investments which challenges organizations to decide whether 
certain, immediate success should be hedged for a chance of future success. 
 
Another tension between exploration and exploitation that challenges manufacturing companies 
to balance exploration and exploitation, involves the differences in mindsets and organizational 
routines needed for both activities. Whereas mechanistic structures support routine operations, 
functional specialization, formal duties, responsibilities and power, organic structures entail less 
rigid establishments (Burns and Wholey, 1993; Burns and Stalker, 1961). These alternative 
structures can correspondingly facilitate exploitation or exploration. Exploration entails non-
routine problem solving and search for new knowledge that may make information processing 
inefficient under centralized decision-making. In turn, formalization is expected to constrain 
exploration and facilitate exploitation via incremental improvements in processes and products 
(Lavie et al., 2010). Idea generation requires out-of-the-box thinking, risk taking, and tolerance 
of mistakes. Idea implementation, in contrast, happens within organizational constraints. These 
differences in nature between exploration and exploitation imply that organizations that have 
invested in organizing exploitation face major challenges when attempting exploration, and vice 
versa (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). 
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A third contradiction between exploration and exploitation concerns the iteratively self-enforcing 
nature of both types of activities. Because of the broad diffusion in the range of possible 
outcomes, exploration often leads to failure, which in turn promotes the search for even newer 
ideas and thus more exploration (Gupta et al., 2006), which may trap organizations in an 
“endless   cycle   of   failure   and   unrewarding   change”   (Levinthal   and  March,   1993).   In   contrast,  
exploitation often leads to early success, which in turn reinforces further exploitation along the 
same trajectory. The more immediate returns from exploitation tend to cause organizations to 
exhibit a myopic bias whereby exploitation is overemphasized at the expense of exploration 
(Levinthal and March, 1993). Individuals and organizations tend to pursue solutions similar to 
already-known solutions because bounded rationality limits their ability to search all possible 
domains of knowledge (Simon, 1979) and biases them toward more salient areas of their own 
prior experiences (Cyert and March, 1963). Over time, these behaviors become deeply embedded 
in the organization (McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 1999)  and  once  changes  in  an  organization’s  
environment asks for reconfiguration of exploration and exploitation, the switching costs 
involved in changing core capabilities may have become high (Kogut and Zander, 1992). 
 
In the past decades, an emerging stream of research has suggested several organizational 
alternatives to overcome the contradictions between these conflicting activities (for an overview 
of this research, see Lavie et al., 2010; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008), and to improve 
effectiveness of explorative and exploitative NPD processes (for an overview, see Damanpour, 
1991; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Ernst, 2002). Conflicting demands between exploration and 
exploration can be addressed by using spatial differentiation, such as creating organizational 
spinouts to pursue new opportunities (Christensen and Bower 1996, Galunic and Eisenhardt 
2001, Gilbert, 2005). Other studies described an alternative path to combining exploration and 
exploitation by managing them separately within the same organizational unit.  The use of 
parallel structures allows people to switch back and forth between two or more types of 
structures, depending on the structure that their specific task requires (Bushe and Shani, 1991; 
McDonough and Leifer, 1983; Stein and Kanter, 1980; Zand, 1974). Here, an organizational 
unit’s   main   structure   serves   exploitative   activities   and   can   be   used   for   routine   tasks   and   for  
maintenance of stability and efficiency. Additional structures, such as cross-functional team 
structures (Griffin, 1997; Pittiglio  et  al.,  1995;;  Song  et  al.,  1997)  balance  the  primary  structure’s  
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shortcomings and support non-routine tasks and innovation (Goldstein, 1985). The 
supplementary structure coexists with the primary task structure to ensure efficiency and 
flexibility (Adler et al., 1999).  
 
In this literature, focus has been on structural factors. Relying on structural contingency theory, 
these  studies  assume  that  innovation  is  determined  by  organizational  characteristics  and  “share  a  
common deterministic orientation by which organizational behavior is seen to be shaped by a 
series  of  impersonal  mechanisms  that  act  as  external  constraints  on  actors”  (Astley  and  Van  de  
Ven, 1983). However, few studies pay attention to innovation in terms of the characteristics and 
actions of organizational participants that work in these structures. Much of the applied literature 
on the management of new product development has ignored the research by cognitive 
psychologists and social-psychologists about the capacity of human beings to handle complexity 
and maintain attention (Van de Ven, 1986). The way people acquire and process information can 
be  a  better  predictor  of   an   individual’s   success   in  a  particular   situation   than  situational   factors  
(Kozhenikov, 2007). In the field of industrial and organizational behavior, cognitive style is 
considered a fundamental factor determining both individual and organizational behavior as it 
affects problem-solving, decision-making and creativity (Sadler-Smith and Badger, 1998). 
Several scholars suggested that cognitive inclinations of senior-management might have 
significant impact on the ability of a firm to deal with contradictions and engage in explorative 
and  exploitative  activities  (e.g.  Lewin  et  al.,  1999;;  Hambrick  et  al.,  2005;;  O’Reilly and Tushman, 
2008). It has also been proposed that different cognitive styles vary in their effectiveness in 
initiating and implementing innovations (Sadler-Smith and Badger, 1998). Besides structural 
factors, cognitive characteristics of individuals and groups of individuals thus might play an 
important role in balancing and organizing explorative and exploitative NPD processes within 
manufacturing firms. To date, however, very few empirical studies have examined the 
relationship between cognitive characteristics and the ability to engage in exploration and 
exploitation (e.g. Gupta et al., 2006; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; Papadakis and Bourantas, 
2007).  
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In this thesis we investigate effects of cognitive and structural factors in NPD, taking into 
account the multi-dimensionality of innovation. The central question of this thesis is: To what 
extent do cognitive and structural factors influence explorative and exploitative innovation in 
manufacturing firms? In this thesis, this question will be addressed in four chapters (see figure 
1), which build on previous studies on exploration and exploitation that were conducted within 
the strategic research orientation Management of Innovation and Entrepreneurship at the 
University of Twente (e.g. Bernasco et al., 1999; Visscher et al., 2005; Visscher and De Weerd-
Nederhof, 2006; De Weerd-Nederhof et al., 2008; Faems et al., 2011). Moreover, the work 
contained in this thesis has been conducted within the scope of the Competenties voor Innovatie 
project, which is supported by Pieken in de Delta Oost Nederland. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: key concepts and their relationships  
 
Ch. 2: To what extent do cognitive styles of CEOs influence exploration and exploitation?  
Previous studies have provided valuable insights into how environmental and organizational 
factors may influence levels of explorative and exploitative innovation in firms (e.g. Duncan, 
1976;;   Tushman   and   O’Reilly,   1996;;   Jansen   et   al.,   2009;;   Jansen   et   al.,   2005;;   Tushman   and  
O’Reilly,  1996;;  Benner  and  Tushman,  2003). At the same time, scholars suggest that individual 
characteristics, such as cognitive and behavioral inclinations of top executives, might also have 
significant impact on the ability of a firm to engage in explorative and exploitative activities (e.g. 
Lewin  et  al.,  1999;;  Hambrick  et  al.,  2005;;  O’Reilly  and  Tushman,  2008).  The importance of the 
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CEO is of interest, especially in medium-sized companies, where the CEO appears to be most 
influential (Miller and Toulouse, 1986). Very few studies, however, have quantitatively 
examined the relationship between individual characteristics of top managers and firm-level 
exploration and exploitation (e.g. Gupta et al., 2006; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; Papadakis 
and Bourantas, 2007). Most of the existing research focuses on observable managerial 
characteristics and the composition of top management teams (e.g. Lubatkin et al., 2006; Mom et 
al., 2009; Papadakis and Bourantas, 2007). Therefore, some important psychological issues may 
have been bypassed. With our first study, we complement prior research in two fundamental 
ways. First, whereas previous studies focus on extrinsic organizational factors that influence 
individual exploration and exploitation, we rely on insights from cognitive psychology (e.g. 
Bruner et al., 1956; Witkin et al., 1962; Miller, 1987; Hayes and Allinson, 1994) to hypothesize a 
relationship   between   intrinsic   factors   (i.e.   cognitive   style)   and   individuals’   tendency   for  
exploration versus exploitation. Second, whereas existing research remains silent on the 
implications of individual CEO characteristics for firm performance, we hypothesize a 
relationship   between   the   CEOs’   tendency   for   exploration   or   exploitation   and   firm-level 
innovation performance.  
 
Ch. 3: To what extent do cognitive styles in teams influence exploration and exploitation?  
To  date,  only  few  studies  investigated  the  link  between  NPD  team  members’  personal  attributes  
and project performance (Miron-Spektor et al., 2011). Most studies that have tested the 
performance effects of team characteristics have focused on demographic variables, such as 
education and functional background, age, and organizational tenure (e.g., Ancona and Caldwell, 
1992; Hulsheger et al., 2009; Lovelace et al., 2001). Although demographic differences have 
been shown to influence team performance, underlying psychological characteristics such as 
personality attributes have been found to be better predictors of team performance over time 
(Bell, 2007; Harrison et al., 2002). While others have offered some evidence on how cognitive 
styles   may   affect   creativity   (Kurtzberg,   2005)   or   the   innovative   quality   of   team’s   activities  
(Miron-Spektor et al., 2011), our second study offers a perspective on how teams may be 
composed to foster the kinds of psychological states that lead to overall project performance in 
explorative and exploitative new product development projects.  
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Ch. 4: To what extent do organizational integration structures influence exploration and 
exploitation?  
During the past decades, scholars have increasingly studied the NPD process within firms (for an 
overview of this research, see Damanpour, 1991; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Ernst, 2002). In 
these studies, the structural design of the NPD process has been recognized as one of the critical 
success factors to arrive at successful innovation (Cooper, 2003). In particular, the 
implementation of structural mechanisms such as cross-functional integration structures (Griffin, 
1997; Pittiglio et al., 1995; Song et al., 1997), stage-gate processes (Cooper, 1996; Cooper et al., 
2004), and formalized NPD procedures (Kerssens-van Drongelen and De Weerd-Nederhof, 
1999; Lilly and Porter, 2003) have been found to positively influence the innovation 
performance of firms. At the same time, it is increasingly recognized that the NPD process is a 
multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing development processes that focus on the 
improvement of existing products as well as processes that focus on the generation of new 
products. Moreover, several scholars (Olson et al., 1995; Olson et al., 2001; Song and Xie, 2000) 
have provided evidence that, within a particular NPD project, the product innovativeness 
moderates the relationship between the effectiveness of the integration structure (i.e. formal 
versus cross-functional integration structure) and the performance of the NPD project. However, 
these studies have solely focused on the project level (Sánchez and Pérez, 2003; Brettel et al., 
2011). As a result, we do not know whether firms tend to apply different kinds of integration 
structures for different kinds of NPD processes and how the application of particular integration 
structures in particular NPD processes influences firm-level innovation performance. In the third 
study of this thesis, we therefore conduct a firm-level assessment of the impact of different kinds 
of integration structures in different kinds of NPD processes on different kinds of firm 
innovation performance. 
 
Ch. 5:  How do structural and cognitive factors influence the evolution of exploration and 
exploitation over time? 
Previous studies have emphasized the complexity of balancing exploration and exploitation 
levels (e.g. Sorensen, 2002; Voss et al., 2008; Benner, 2007) and have provided insights into 
structural and individual factors that influence them (e.g. Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Burns and 
Stalker,   1961;;   Benner   and   Tushman,   2003;;   Tushman   and   O’Reilly,   1996;;   Scott   and   Bruce,  
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1994). Whereas the individualist perspective seeks to explain innovative behavior in terms of 
characteristics and actions of organizational participants, the structural perspective assumes that 
innovation is most strongly influenced by organizational characteristics such as formalization, 
slack resources and organizational structure. Although these studies have provided valuable 
insights into the factors that influence exploration in organizations, only few have unraveled the 
process of how these structural and individual factors affect changing exploration levels in 
growing organizations. Since the time dimension is mostly absent in existing studies (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005) and only partial relationships are illuminated (Eisenhardt 
et al., 2010), it remains unclear how structural and individual antecedents in growing 
organizations interrelate and how they affect exploration decline and recovery. Therefore the 
purpose of the fourth study in this thesis is to provide in-depth insights into the dynamics of a 
growing  organization’s   exploration   levels   and   to   explain   how   structural   and   individual   factors  
impact these over time. In order to do so, we conduct a single case study in a fast growing R&D 
organization in the wind turbine blade industry. Based on a unique collection of time-accounting 
data and descriptions of all R&D activities performed within a timeframe of 100 months, we 
measure the dynamics of exploration levels, visualizing in great detail how a firm goes through 
transitions from focus on exploration to exploitation and vice versa. Based on a series of 
interviews with employees of this organization, we demonstrate how structural and individual 
factors interact and impact this evolution.  
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2 
EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION WITHIN FIRMS: 
THE  IMPACT  OF  CEOs’  COGNITIVE  STYLE 
ON INCREMENTAL AND RADICAL INNOVATION PERFORMANCE1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars (e.g. Ancona et al., 2001; Benner and Tushman, 2002; Dougherty, 1992; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Feinberg and Gupta, 2004; Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 
1991, 1996, 2006) stress the need for companies to manage an appropriate mix of explorative 
and exploitative innovation activities in order to survive in the long-term. Explorative activities 
can be characterized by terms such as search, variation, risk-taking, experimentation, play, 
flexibility and discovery (March, 1991). Exploitative activities are associated with aspects such 
as refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation and execution (March, 
1991).  
 
Although  both  types  of  activities  are  essential  for  a  firm’s  survival  and  prosperity  (Lavie  et  al.,  
2010), many scholars have indicated a challenging tension between exploration and exploitation 
as they compete for the same scarce resources and demand radically different mindsets and 
organizational routines (e.g. March, 1991; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Sorensen and Stuart, 
2000). Existing research on organizational ambidexterity has provided valuable insights into how 
structural characteristics of firms or business units influence the ability to combine explorative 
and exploitative activities (e.g. Duncan, 1976; Tushman and O’Reilly,  1996;;  Jansen  et  al.,  2009; 
Jansen et al., 2005; Tushman and O’Reilly,   1996;;   Benner   and   Tushman,   2003).   At   the   same  
                                                          
1 This chapter is based on previous papers: 
De Visser, M., Faems, D., Van den Top, P., 2011. Exploration and exploitation within SMEs: connecting 
the CEO's cognitive style to product innovation performance. In proceedings of the International Product 
Development Management Conference, Delft, The Netherlands, June 5-7. 
 
De Visser, M., Faems, D., Van den Top, P., 2011. Exploration and exploitation within SMEs: connecting 
the CEO's cognitive style to product innovation performance. Presented at the INSCOPE Conference, 
Enschede, The Netherlands, October 12. 
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time, scholars suggest that individual characteristics, such as cognitive and behavioral 
inclinations of senior-management, might also have significant impact on the ability of a firm to 
engage in explorative and exploitative activities (e.g. Lewin et al., 1999; Hambrick et al., 2005; 
O’Reilly   and   Tushman,   2008).   However,   very   few   studies   have   quantitatively   examined   the  
relationship between  individual  characteristics  of  top  managers  and  the  firms’  ability  to  engage  
in exploration and exploitation (e.g. Gupta et al., 2006; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; Papadakis 
and Bourantas, 2007). A recent study of Mom et al. (2009) is a notable exception in this respect. 
This study demonstrates that managers can substantially differ in their explorative and 
exploitative   behavior.   In   addition,   they   show   that   managers’   individual   engagement   in  
explorative and exploitative activities depends on organizational design factors such as 
managers’  decision-making authority. 
 
With this study, we complement this prior research on individual exploration and exploitation in 
two fundamental ways. First, whereas Mom et al. (2009) focus on extrinsic organizational factors 
that influence individual exploration and exploitation, we rely on insights from cognitive 
psychology (e.g. Bruner, 1956; Witkin et al., 1962; Miller, 1987; Hayes and Allinson, 1994) to 
hypothesize a relationship between intrinsic factors (i.e. cognitive   style)   and   individuals’  
tendency for exploration versus exploitation. Second, whereas existing research remains silent on 
the implications of individual exploration and exploitation for firm performance, we rely on 
Upper Echelon theory (e.g. Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) to 
hypothesize  a  relationship  between  the  CEOs’  tendency  for  exploration  or  exploitation  and  firm-
level product innovation performance.  
 
In order to test our hypotheses, we rely on a unique dataset, containing information on (i) the 
cognitive style of 122 CEOs of Small and Medium Sized Businesses (SMEs) in the Dutch 
manufacturing  industry  as  well  as  (ii)  their  firms’  product  innovation  performance.  As  previous  
studies emphasized the decisive role of CEOs in leading organizations with respect to entering 
new technological domains (e.g. Kaplan, 2008; Tushman et al., 2011), we investigate their 
particular individual characteristics. We focus our study on SMEs because CEOs have been 
found to be a major factor in contributing to innovativeness in small manufacturing firms 
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(Lefebvre and Lefebvre, 1992) and more influential than in larger companies (Papadakis and 
Bourantas, 2007).  
 
Conducting structural equation analyses, our findings show that CEOs with a more analytic 
cognitive style tend to engage more in activities related to exploitation of existing products and 
markets, whereas CEOs with a more intuitive cognitive style tend to engage more in activities 
related to exploration of new products and markets. In line with upper-echelon theory, our data 
also show that such individual tendency toward exploration or exploitation significantly 
influences the allocation of R&D resources within the firm, which in-turn   impacts   firms’  
incremental and radical innovation performance.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, our findings point to the relevance of applying insights from 
cognitive psychology to better understand innovation behavior of top managers. At the same 
time, we contribute to integrating insights from Upper Echelon theory in research on new 
product innovation, illuminating how individual characteristics, resource allocation decisions and 
innovation performance are linked to each other. From a managerial perspective, our data 
suggest that, in the context of SMEs, the intrinsic characteristics of the CEO might have strong 
predictive  value  for  firms’  innovation  performance.   
 
This paper is structured in five sections. First, we rely on insights from cognitive psychology and 
Upper Echelon theory to develop our hypotheses. Second, the methodology is discussed. Next, 
the results of the analyses are presented. Fourth, we point to the main theoretical and managerial 
implications of the findings. Finally, discuss   the  study’s  main   limitations,  and  suggest  avenues  
for future research. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
In   this   section,   we   develop   hypotheses   on   (i)   the   impact   of   CEOs’   cognitive   style   on   their  
tendency toward exploitation or exploration, and (ii) the effects of such individual innovation 
behavior  on  firms’  R&D  investments  and  product   innovation performance. Figure I provides a 
graphical illustration of our hypotheses.  
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Figure I: hypotheses 
 
 
 
The  impact  of  cognitive  style  on  CEOs’  innovation  behavior 
In   order   to   investigate   the   relationship   between   CEOs’   individual   characteristics   and   their  
innovation behavior (i.e. individual tendency toward exploitation and/or exploration), we focus 
on  CEOs’   information  processing  strategies  or   the  way   they  acquire,   store and use knowledge. 
More specifically, we concentrate on cognitive style, a core concept in cognitive psychology that 
is   defined   as   ‘the   consistent   individual   differences   in   preferred   ways   of   organizing   and  
processing information and experience’  (Messick, 1976).  
 
Several scholars stress the importance of cognitive style to better understand organizational 
behavior. Schweiger (1983), for instance, provides the following statement:  
 
‘if research indicates [. . .] that particular cognitive styles are more appropriate than others 
for the conduct of particular managerial activities, then normative recommendations 
concerning the selection and placement of individuals for these activities may be 
warranted. In addition, if it is found that cognitive styles are subject to modification, then 
the development of training programs in the industrial setting, or modifications of current 
business  school  curricula  in  the  academic  setting,  may  be  critical.’ 
  
In line with these arguments, scholars (e.g. Kirton, 1980; McHale and Flegg, 1985; Ash, 1986; 
Mitchell et al., 2004; Armstrong and Hird, 2009) study the relevance and consequences of 
cognitive style in contexts such as team composition and training and development. In these 
studies, cognitive style is operationalized   in   terms   of   Wilson’s   (1988)   cognitive   style  
classification,   which   relies   on   Ornstein’s   (1977)   brain   hemispherical   research   to   identify  
Cognitive  
Style  
Index 
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(Exploitation – 
(minus) 
Exploration) 
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Performance 
Incremental 
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+ + 
- 
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different cognitive functions and associate them with the right and left hemispheres in the human 
brain.  
 
Individuals that have a cognitive style associated with left-brain functions prefer to converge 
information. The term often used to describe left-brain  thinking  is  “analysis”  (e.g.  Agor,  1986;;  
Hammond et al., 1987; Allinson and Hayes, 1996). Analysis refers to judgment based on mental 
reasoning and a focus on detail. Analysts (left-brain dominant people) tend to be more compliant, 
favor a structured approach to problem solving, depend on systematic methods of investigation, 
recall verbal material most readily and are especially comfortable with ideas requiring step by 
step analysis (Allinson and Hayes, 1996). 
 
Individuals that have a cognitive style associated with right-brain functions prefer to diverge 
information. The term often used to describe right-brain thinking  is  “intuition”  (e.g.  Agor,  1986;;  
Hammond et al., 1987; Allinson and Hayes, 1996). Intuition refers to immediate judgment based 
on feeling and the adoption of a global perspective. Intuitivists (right-brain dominant people) 
tend to be relatively nonconformist, prefer an open-ended approach to problem solving, rely on 
random methods of exploration, remember spatial images most easily, and work best with ideas 
requiring overall assessment (Allinson and Hayes, 1996). 
 
Relying on these existing insights, we expect  that  CEOs’  cognitive  style  might  strongly  impact  
their tendency toward exploration or exploitation. Exploration is rooted in variance-increasing 
activities  and  creates  futures  that  may  be  quite  different  from  organizations’  past  routines  (Smith  
and Tushman, 2005). It is associated with experimentation, improvisation, and creativity 
(Chatman and Flynn, 2001; Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003; Van de Ven et al. 1999). For these 
activities, diverging information is essential (Allinson and Hayes, 1996), suggesting the 
importance of right-brain functions. We therefore expect that individuals, who have an intuitive 
cognitive style, are likely to engage more in explorative activities than exploitative activities.  
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Exploitation is rooted in variance-decreasing activities  and  builds  on  organizations’  past  routines  
(Smith and Tushman, 2005). It is associated with efficiency, focus and standardization (Chatman 
and Flynn, 2001; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Van de Ven et al., 1999). Hence, for these 
activities, converging information and left-brain functions are essential (Allinson and Hayes, 
1996). We therefore expect that individuals with an analytic cognitive style are likely to engage 
more in exploitative activities above explorative activities. Jointly, these expectations result into 
the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
The more analytic (intuitive) the cognitive style of CEOs, the stronger their focus on exploitative 
(explorative) activities 
 
The   impact   of   a   CEO’s   innovation   behavior   on   R&D   resource   allocation   and   firm 
innovation performance 
Upper Echelon theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) states that organizational outcomes such as 
strategic choices and performance levels are partially predicted by managerial background 
characteristics. From this perspective, organizational outcomes are viewed as reflections of the 
values and cognitive bases of powerful actors in the organization. If strategic choices have a 
large behavioral component, they are likely to reflect the idiosyncrasies of decision makers. 
March and Simon (1958), for instance, argued that each decision maker brings his or her own set 
of cognitive base to an administrative situation, reflected by knowledge or assumptions about 
future events, knowledge of alternatives, and knowledge of consequences attached to 
alternatives. They also reflect his or her values: principles for ordering consequences or 
alternatives according to preference. These are in place at the same time the decision maker is 
being exposed to an ongoing stream of potential stimuli both within and outside the organization. 
The decision maker brings a cognitive base and values to a decision, which create a screen 
between the situation and his or her eventual perception of it (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Child, 
1972; Miller and Toulouse, 1986).  
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Following   these  Upper  Echelon  Theory  arguments,  we  expect   that  CEOs’   innovation  behavior  
has a significant impact on strategic decision making. Building on previous findings by Barker 
and Mueller (2002), who found that CEO characteristics explain a significant proportion of a 
firm’s  relative  R&D  spending,  we  expect  that  CEOs’  individual  characteristics  are  also  reflected  
in  how  firms’  resources  are  allocated  to  different  types  of  innovation  activities.  Specifically,  we  
hypothesize  that  CEOs’  orientation  toward exploration and exploitation significantly influences 
how firms allocate R&D resources to explorative and exploitative activities. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The degree to which CEOs focus on exploitative (explorative) activities is positively related to 
the percentage of R&D resources that is allocated to exploitative (explorative) activities within 
the firm  
 
The distinction between incremental and radical innovation is one of the central notions in the 
existing literature on technical innovation (Mansfield, 1968; Freeman, 1982). Incremental 
innovation introduces relatively minor changes to the existing product, exploits the potential of 
the established design, and often reinforces the dominance of established firms (e.g. Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). This type of innovation is the result of exploitative 
activities, characterized by refinement and extension of existing competencies, technologies, and 
paradigms, and involves the use and development of things already known (March, 1991). 
Radical innovation, in contrast, is based on a different set of engineering and scientific principles 
and often opens up whole new markets and potential applications (e.g. Dess and Beard, 1984; 
Dewar and Dutton, 1986). These innovations are facilitated by exploration, which is in essence 
the experimentation with new alternatives and involves the pursuit of new knowledge. Therefore, 
we expect that the allocation of R&D resources across exploitative and explorative activities 
substantially  influences  a  firms’  incremental and radical innovation performance:  
 
Hypothesis 3a 
Higher   allocation   of   R&D   resources   to   exploitative   activities   increases   firms’   incremental  
product innovation performance 
 
17 
 
Hypothesis 3b 
Higher allocation of R&D resources to exploitative activities  decreases  a  firms’  radical  product  
innovation performance 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data and sample 
In order to test our hypotheses, we rely on a sample of Dutch SMEs. To select firms, we started 
from the Nedsoft database containing company information of 703432 Dutch companies, which 
represents 94% of all Dutch companies registered by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS). As this study focuses on product innovation in SME companies, we excluded all non-
manufacturing companies and all companies with more than 250 employees. We also removed 
all companies of which no contact information was available. We sent a questionnaire to the 
CEO of the 2523 remaining companies and a reminder a week after, which resulted in 254 valid 
responses (10%). Out of these 254 companies, 122 indicated to invest in R&D (48%). This is 
close to SME information provided by the Statistics Netherlands agency, that reports an R&D 
investment percentage of 55%. This indicates that our initial sample is representative for Dutch 
manufacturing SMEs. 
 
This study relies on single informant data and uses perceptual scales. To check for potential bias 
from   using   a   single   source,   we   performed   a   Harman’s   one-factor test on the items that were 
included in the hypothesized models. This test calculates whether a single factor accounts for 
most of the covariance in the dependent and independent variables (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). 
We did not find such a single factor as only 26% of the variance was explained by a single factor 
solution, which indicates that our data did not face major common method bias problems.  
 
Measures 
Independent variable: cognitive style 
There are many instruments available to measure cognitive style, of which the most commonly 
used are the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers, 1962), the Kirton Adaptation-Innovation 
Inventory (Kirton, 1976) and the Cognitive Style Index (Allinson and Hayes, 1996). To measure 
CEOs’   cognitive   style,  we   adopted   the  Cognitive   Style   Index   (CSI)   from  Allinson and Hayes 
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(1996) as it is specifically designed for managerial and professional individuals (Armstrong et 
al., 2011). The CSI measures cognitive style on a bipolar analytic - intuitive dimension and 
contains 38 items (true; uncertain; false). Some examples of these items are: 
 
 “Formal  plans  are  more  of  a  hindrance  than  a  help  in  my  work”   
“I  am  most  effective  when  my  work  involves  a  clear  sequence  of  tasks  to  be  performed” 
 “My  approach  to  solving  a  problem  is  to  focus  on  one  part  at  a  time” 
 “I  am  inclined  to  scan  through  reports  rather  than  read  them  in  detail” 
 
The CSI score is calculated by the sum of all 38 item scores (true = 2, neutral = 1, false = 0), of 
which some are reverse coded. The higher the CSI score, the more analytic the cognitive style of 
the respondent. A low CSI score, on the other hand, refers to the presence of an intuitive 
cognitive style.  
 
Since the inter-item correlations of the CSI tend to be low with little variance, Allison and Hayes 
used a factor analysis of parcels of items to test the internal structure of the index. Following the 
proposed method by Allison and Hayes, we grouped the 38 items in six parcels and performed 
confirmatory factor analysis to test the structure of the scale. Our results indicate that the 
hypothesized single factor solution is confirmed and that this accounts for over half of the 
variance. The CSI scores as composed by our data show a sample mean score of 37.86 (see table 
III).   To   check   for   reliability,   we   computed   the   Cronbach’s   alpha   (0.75),   which indicates that 
these 38 items represent one single construct. 
 
Dependent   variables:  CEO’s   innovation   behavior,  R&D  resource   allocation   and   indicators   of  
product innovation performance 
In order to measure exploration and exploitation on the individual level, we adopted the scale 
from Mom et al. (2009). This scale is based on the features by which March (1991) characterized 
exploration and exploitation, and uses seven items to measure the level of managers’  exploration  
orientation, and seven items measuring   managers’   exploitation   orientation.   All   items   are  
measured on a five-point  Likert  scale  ranging  from  “a  very  small  extent”  to  “a  very  large  extent”  
of engagement in explorative and exploitative activities. Results of factor analysis (see table I) 
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confirm a two-factor structure of the data. We removed one of the exploration activities items for 
cross-loading, and one of the exploitation activities items because of low factor loading (<.5). 
We  checked  the  reliability  of  the  scale  by  computing  Cronbach’s  alpha (0.79 for exploration and 
0.83 for exploitation).  
 
Table I:  Factor  analysis  for  CEO’s  innovation  behavior 
 
 
By   combining   the   scales   for   exploration   and   exploitation,   we   created   a   measure   for   CEOs’  
innovation behavior. We subtracted the mean score of the six exploration items from the mean 
score of the six exploitation items. In this way, CEOs, who have an exploration focus, will have 
a negative score (min. -4) and CEOs, who have an exploitation focus, will have a positive score 
(max. 4) on this innovation behavior variable.  
 
We  measured  firms’  R&D  resource  allocation  by  asking  respondents  how  during  the  past  three  
years their respective R&D resources were allocated across (i) explorative innovation projects, 
which were defined as projects focused on R&D activities such as fundamental research, 
experiments and building of prototypes, and (ii) exploitative innovation projects, which were 
 
Items Factors 
To what extent did you, last year, engage in work related activities that can be characterized as follows: 1 2 
A manager’s exploration activities (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79):   
Searching for new possibilities with respect to products/services, processes, or markets  -.487 .514 
Evaluating diverse options with respect to products/services, processes, or markets -.397 .568 
Focusing on strong renewal of products/services or processes -.296 .574 
Activities of which the associated yields or costs are currently unclear -.018 .684 
Activities requiring quite some adaptability of you .190 .703 
Activities requiring you to learn new skills or knowledge -.027 .752 
Activities that are not (yet) clearly existing company policy -.181 .572 
A manager’s exploitation activities (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83):   
Activities of which a lot of experience has been accumulated by yourself .674 .002 
Activities which you carry out as if it were routine .727 -.213 
Activities which serve existing (internal) customers with existing services/products .636 .011 
Activities of which it is clear to you how to conduct them .806 -.066 
Activities primarily focused on achieving short-term goals .390 -.141 
Activities which you can properly conduct by using your present knowledge .759 -.155 
Activities which clearly fit into existing company policy .629 -.073 
 
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax 
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defined as projects focused on R&D activities such as standardization, optimization, fine-tuning 
and up-scaling. Based on this information, we constructed the variable R&D Resource 
Allocation representing the percentage of R&D resources invested in exploitative activities. 
Variable scores can range from 0 (no R&D resources allocated to exploitation) to 100 (all R&D 
resources allocated to exploitation). 
 
Following previous research (Faems et al. 2005; De Visser et al., 2010; Neyens et al., 2010) we 
used the composition of turnover in 2009 in order to make a distinction between incremental and 
radical product innovation performance. The proportion of turnover in 2009 attributed to new 
products that were introduced during the last three years is regarded as an indicator of radical 
product innovation performance. Likewise, the percentage of turnover in 2009 attributed to 
improved products that were introduced during the last three years is seen as an indicator of 
incremental product innovation performance. In order to obtain a normal distribution, our 
analyses include the logarithm of 1+ the proportion of turnover attributed to (1) new products 
and (2) improved products. 
 
Control variables 
The period of time a CEO is active in the firm might impact his or her orientation toward 
exploration  and  exploitation  (Tushman  and  O’Reilly,  1996).  In  order  to  control  for  this  effect,  we  
included a variable measuring how long CEOs have been working in the company.  The degree 
to which a manager engages in risk-taking   activities   is   also   influenced   by   the  managers’   age  
(Vroom and Pahl, 1971). Older managers are less likely to engage in risky activities than young 
managers. As exploration is associated with risk-taking activities (March, 1996), we included a 
variable   to   control   for   age   effects   on   CEOs’   innovation   behavior.   Education   is   related   to   the  
cognitive ability of individuals to process information and may therefore be related to a 
managers’   innovation   behavior   (Papadakis,   1998).   We   controlled   for   educational   effects   on  
CEOs’   innovation   behavior   by   including   a   dummy   variable  measuring   whether   CEOs   have   a  
master’s  degree  or  not. 
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In the innovation literature considerable attention is devoted to the relationship between 
innovation performance and environmental dynamics (e.g. Jansen et al., 2005; Sorensen and 
Stuart, 2000; Levinthal and Posen, 2009; Sainio et al., 2012). Firms that operate in a dynamic 
environment, tend to be more innovative than firms that operate in a stable environment (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984). We therefore adopted a four-item scale from Jansen et al. (2006) to control 
for environmental factors that might influence radical and incremental innovation performance.  
To  check  for  reliability,  we  computed  the  Cronbach’s  alpha  (0.83),  which  is  satisfactory. 
 
We also expect that R&D intensity impacts innovation performance (Singh, 1986). Therefore, 
we included a variable measuring the R&D investments / sales ratio to control for this effect. 
Finally, because of potential industry differences in terms of product innovation performance, we 
controlled for them by introducing industry dummies. A distinction was made among 7 
industries.  The  “other”  sector  was  used  as  the  reference  category  in  the  study’s  analyses.  Table  II  
provides an overview of the frequencies of the different industries. 
 
Table II: Industry frequencies 
 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table III gives an overview of the most important descriptive statistics. The means for the 
variables radical innovation performance and incremental product innovation performance are 
0.22 and 0.26. Taking into account that this study uses logarithmic transformation for these 
variables, the implication is that, on average, respondents attributed 26.4% of their sales to new  
Industry Frequency Percent 
Textile 8 6.6 
Wood 3 2.5 
Construction 8 6.6 
Plastic 11 9.0 
Metal 49 40.2 
Software 14 11.5 
Other 29 23.8 
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products and 30.6% to improved products. This also implies that on average 43.0% of their sales 
was attributed to products that were introduced before 2007 and have not been improved since 
then. 
 
To test the hypotheses, structural equation modeling (SEM) with manifest variables is used. 
Compared with ordinary linear regression models, this technique has two advantages (Sels et al., 
2006). First, the method enables hypothesized relationships between variables to be defined and 
tested. The output indicates whether the model is supported by the data as a whole and gives a 
significance test for the various individual relationships. Second, a variable in a SEM can be 
either dependent or independent. This allows for testing the indirect influence, if any, of certain 
variables (Faems et al., 2010). 
 
The goodness-of-fit overview (Table IV) indicates that the theoretical model is not adequately 
supported by the data. To optimize the model, paths were added from industry, market dynamics 
and   R&D   investments   to   CEO’s   innovation   behavior   and   allocation   of   R&D   resources.   The  
resulting model is presented in Figure II. The goodness-of-fit measures indicate that the 
optimized model is effectively supported by the data. 
 
Table IV: Goodness-of-fit measures 
 
 
The Goodness-of-fit measures in Table IV indicate that our optimized model is effectively 
supported by the data. Below, we first discuss the effect of Cognitive  Style  on  CEOs’  Innovation  
Behavior. Subsequently, the effect of CEOs’  Innovation  Behavior  on  Firms’  Allocation  of  R&D  
Resources  is  reported.  Finally,  we  show  the  effects  of  a  Firms’  Allocation  of  R&D  Resources  on  
Radical and Incremental Product Innovation Performance. The standardized path coefficients are 
listed in Table V. The results of the test of the optimized model are also represented in Figure II. 
 
Fit measure  Theoretical Model Optimized Model 
Bentler’s  Comparative  Fit  Index   0.9302 0.9687 
Bentler  and  Bonett’s  Normed  Fit  Index   0.8519 0.9298 
Chi-Square Test (p-Value)  0.0771 0.1607 
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Table V: Standardized path coefficients 
 
 
Figure II: Results of optimized model 
 
 
 
In line with our first hypothesis, we observe a positive relationship between the Cognitive Style 
Index  score  and  CEOs’  Innovation  Behavior.  This  result  confirms  that  a  more  analytic  cognitive  
style  has  a  positive  impact  on  a  CEOs’  tendency   toward  exploitation, whereas a more intuitive 
cognitive  style  has  a  positive  impact  on  CEOs’  tendency  toward  exploration.  Our  data  also  show  
a   positive   relationship   between   CEOs’   Innovation   Behavior   and   firms’   Allocation   of   R&D  
Resources. Based on how these variables are measured, this result implies that, when the CEO 
 
Path from / to (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Cognitive Style Index 2.2616*    
(2)  CEO’s  Innovation  Behavior    
(Exploitation – (minus) Exploration)   2.0280*   
(3) Allocation of R&D Resources (% Exploitation)   -3.0973** 2.4721* 
(4) LN (Radical Innovation Performance)      
(5) LN (Incremental Innovation Performance)      
Control Variables     
(6) Market Dynamics -2.0664* 0.0590 1.3036 -0.0843 
(7) Textile -0.1758 -0.6720 -1.7062† -2.4320* 
(8) Wood -0.9494 0.1127 -1.5358 -0.4028 
(9) Construction -1.9223† -0.2328 -0.9807 -1.1783 
(10) Plastic  -1.9009† 0.2752 -1.1930 -1.1349 
(11) Metal -1.1968 -1.0450 -0.9839 -0.6074 
(12) Software -2.5323* -0.7920 0.9123 1.0576 
(13) R&D Investments (% of Sales) -1.4802 -1.0073 2.2391* 0.1009 
(14) CEO’s  Tenure  in  the  Firm  .06126    
(15) CEO’s  Age -0.2891    
(16) CEO’s  Master’s Degree 1.2629    
 
†  p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 
* p<.05; ** p<.01 
 
Cognitive  
Style  
Index 
CEO’s 
Innovation 
Behavior 
(Exploitation – 
(minus) 
Exploration) 
 
Allocation of 
R&D Resources 
(% Exploitation) 
 
 
LN (Radical 
Innovation 
Performance) 
LN (Incremental 
Innovation 
Performance) 
 
2.2616* 2.0280* 
-3.0973** 
-2.4721* 
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has a stronger focus on exploitation, the share of R&D resources that are spent on exploitative 
activities will be larger. In contrast, a stronger focus on exploration will trigger an increase in the 
allocation of R&D resources to explorative activities. These results confirm that, within SMEs, 
the  CEOs’  innovation  behavior  has  a  strong  impact  on  firm-level allocation decisions. 
 
As stated in H3, firms that allocate more R&D Resources to exploitative activities were expected 
to perform higher in terms of Incremental Innovation Performance, and lower in terms of Radical 
Innovation Performance. These hypotheses are supported by our data as Allocation of R&D 
Resources (% Exploitation) has a significant (p<.05) positive direct effect on Incremental 
Innovation Performance, and a significant (p<.01) negative effect on Radical Innovation 
Performance.  
 
Regarding our control variables, we did not observe any significant impact of Market Dynamics 
on innovation performance. However, we observed a significant (p<.05) negative impact of 
Market   Dynamics   on   CEOs’   Innovation   Behavior;;   in   more   dynamic   markets,   CEOs   have   a  
stronger tendency toward explorative activities. This complements earlier findings by Sidhu et al. 
(2004),   who   found   a   positive   relationship   between   environmental   dynamism   and   managers’  
scope of information search to reduce uncertainty.  
 
Further, a significant (p<.05) positive relationship between R&D intensity and Radical 
Innovation Performance was found; companies that invest more in R&D display higher Radical 
Innovation Performance. The data also point to a number of industry effects. Compared to other 
industries, companies in the Textile Industry perform significantly lower in terms of Incremental 
(p<.05) and Radical (p<.10) Innovation Performance. Finally, CEOs in the Software industry 
demonstrate a significantly (p<.10) lower engagement in exploitative activities compared to 
other industries. 
 
DISCUSSION  
In this section, we first discuss the theoretical implications of our study. In particular, we discuss 
(i)   the  relevance  of  cognitive  psychology   to  better  understand  CEOs’   innovation  focus  and   (ii)  
the relevance of Upper-Echelon theory to better understand the link between individual 
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innovation focus and innovation performance. Subsequently, we point to the main managerial 
implications. Finally, we discuss the main limitations of this study. 
 
Implications  for  CEOs’  innovation  behavior 
Whereas the current literature on exploration and exploitation mainly focuses on factors on the 
business unit and firm level, some scholars have suggested the relevance of investigating 
individual characteristics to explain differences in orientation toward explorative and exploitative 
activities.   Recently,   Mom   et   al.   (2009)   identified   structural   factors   that   impact   a   manager’  
tendency toward exploration and exploitation (e.g. formal structural mechanisms and personal 
coordination mechanisms). This study complements the findings of Mom et al. (2009), 
identifying cognitive style as an important personal factor that plays a significant role in 
explaining  individuals’  focus  on  exploration  or  exploitation. 
 
Our data support our hypotheses that CEOs, who have analytic cognitive styles, prefer to 
converge information and therefore engage more in exploitative activities than CEOs, who have 
an intuitive cognitive style. These findings point to the relevance of applying insights from 
cognitive psychology to better understand innovation behavior of top managers.  
 
Innovation  performance  implications  of  CEO’s  innovation  behavior 
We contribute to integrating insights from upper-echelon theory in research on new product 
innovation. Our findings illuminate how individual characteristics, resource allocation decisions 
and innovation performance are linked to each other. The upper echelon approach views strategic 
choice as a function of the demographic and psychological composition of top managers and 
suggests several factors that impact the strategic direction and performance levels of a firm, such 
as age, functional tracks, other career experiences, education, socioeconomic roots and financial 
position (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Because of the difficulties of studying the mental 
representations and other psychological  characteristics  of  the  organization’s  executive  members,  
Hambrick and Mason (1984) advocated indirect methods of cognitive assessment, whereby 
executives’   background   characteristics   (e.g.   education,   functional   specialization)   are   used   as  
proxies for cognitive variables in the prediction of organizational outcomes (Hodgkinson and 
Healey, 2008).  
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Using a direct method to assess cognitive style of CEOs, our study supports the view that 
strategic decision-making is influenced by the cognitive base of top managers. In particular, our 
findings show how cognitive characteristics and individual inclinations for explorative and 
exploitative activities influence strategic decision-making on allocating resources to exploration 
and  exploitation   and   firms’  product innovation performance. Previous studies (e.g. Raisch and 
Birkinshaw, 2008; Virany et al., 1992; He and Wong, 2004) already pointed to the important role 
of  senior  managers  in  organizations’  decisions  between  investing  in  exploration  and  exploitation.  
Our study emphasizes the relevance of upper echelon theory in explaining these strategic 
decisions. 
 
Managerial implications  
In drawing practical implications, this paper has underpinned the importance of the CEO in 
innovation. Our data suggest that cognitive styles of CEOs and their engagement in different 
types of innovation activities significantly impact resource allocation decisions and innovation 
performance in SMEs. Although we acknowledge the practical disadvantage of psychological 
measures compared to demographics, which are much easier to obtain, we argue that, in some 
situations, special attention should be paid to the fit between the individual characteristics of 
CEOs in cognitive style and organizational contexts. For instance, when a CEO is close to 
retirement and on the lookout for a replacement, he or she might assess the cognitive style of 
potential candidates in order to successfully continue the existing strategy of the firm. SMEs that 
are at the beginning of the innovation lifecycle with the majority of their products in more 
exploratory stages, might benefit from an intuitive CEO, whereas small firms that are in later 
stages of the cycle would benefit from a more analytic leader. CEOs characteristics might also be 
relevant for organizations that face the need to transition into a new strategic configuration. In 
cases where the cognitive style of the CEO in charge misfits with the strategic transition pursued, 
this transition could benefit from a CEO with a different style. Finally, our data suggest that, 
when investors are considering to buy stakes in SME companies, it might be interesting to take a 
close look at the personality of the CEO, as this might provide valuable information on the future 
innovation strategy and performance of the focal firm. 
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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A first limitation of our study concerns generalizability. It is an interesting empirical question as 
to whether our findings are generalizable to larger firms. Compared to SMEs, innovation 
outcomes   at   larger   firms   are   often   influenced   by   a   broader   set   of   factors   besides   the   CEO’s  
innovation behavior, such as more complex organizational systems, which make strategic 
decision-making less straightforward. In addition, the influence of CEO at larger firms may also 
be affected by external governance pressures from an independent board of directors and 
shareholders.  We  expect  that  the  statistical  relationships  between  CEOs’  Cognitive  Style,  CEOs’  
Innovation Behavior, Allocation of R&D Resources and Innovation Performance may not be as 
strong as what we found with our sample of SMEs (cf. Mom et al., 2009). 
 
A second limitation is related to the cross-sectional nature of our data. Although we built in time 
lags between some of our variables, we were not able to assess long-term effects of changes in 
CEOs’  innovation  behavior.  Future  studies  may  adopt  a  longitudinal  approach  to  increase  insight  
into   how  changes   in  CEOs’   innovation   behavior,   allocation   of  R&D   resources   and   innovation  
performance causally relate to each other. 
 
Furthermore, we limited the focus of this study by investigating how personal characteristics 
relate to innovation behavior and performance, and did not pay attention to how structural 
characteristics influence innovation behavior and firm performance. It would be interesting to 
study how personal characteristics and structural characteristics interact. For instance, we could 
expect that structural characteristics moderate the relationship between cognitive style and 
innovation focus. Future research could investigate the interactions between personal 
characteristics and structural characteristics, such as the formalization of tasks and involvement 
in cross-functional structures, and how they together affect R&D resource allocation and 
innovation performance. 
 
In this paper, we have provided a richer understanding of exploration and exploitation within 
firms, acknowledging the relevance of cognitive style of senior executives in explaining 
differences in innovation behavior and their effects on incremental and radical innovation 
performance. We hope that practitioners in manufacturing firms will consider our practical 
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suggestions and that our results may motivate researchers to continue exploring micro-level 
antecedents of innovation in a wide variety of organizational settings. 
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3 
TEAM COMPOSITION AND NPD PROJECT PERFORMANCE:  
DO COGNITIVE STYLES MATTER? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The new product development (NPD) process is complex and entails numerous uncertainties 
(Brettel et al., 2011). This results in interdependencies between different functional departments 
(Song et al., 1998). To successfully innovate and deal with the complexity of new technologies 
and information, organizations therefore increasingly rely on teams. Existing research on NPD 
teams has mainly focused on the performance implications of cross-functional collaboration. 
These studies show the extent to which teams have members with different functional 
backgrounds (e.g. research and development, marketing, manufacturing) (Lovelace et al., 2001) 
influences team performance because it affects the knowledge, skills, and effort team members 
apply to their task (Bell, 2007; Kozlowski and Klein, 2000). Functionally diverse product 
development teams have access to expertise that would not be available if all team members 
were from the same area. Moreover, the inclusion of various functional backgrounds facilitates 
the product transfer between the departments. 
 
To date, only few studies investigated the link between NPD  team  members’  personal  attributes  
and project performance (Miron-Spektor et al., 2011). Most studies that have tested the 
performance effects of team characteristics have focused on demographic variables, such as 
education and functional background, age, and organizational tenure (e.g., Hulsheger et al., 
2009; Lovelace et al., 2001). Although demographic differences have been shown to influence 
team performance, underlying psychological characteristics such as personality attributes have 
been found to be better predictors of team performance over time (Bell, 2007; Harrison et al., 
2002). Much of the applied literature on the management of new product development, however, 
has ignored the research by cognitive psychologists and social-psychologists about the capacity 
of human beings to handle complexity and maintain attention in teams (Van de Ven, 1986).  
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A personality variable that is believed to be crucially important for both effective decision-
making and successful interpersonal relationships in teams is cognitive style (Agor, 1986; 
Armstrong, 1999; Doktor, 1978; Kirton, 1989; Leonard and Strauss, 1997; Taggart et al., 1985). 
Cognitive style entails two fundamentally different modes of processing information. The 
intuitive style of processing information is preconscious, rapid, non-verbal, holistic and 
intimately associated with affect (Pacini and Epstein, 1999). Conversely, analytical thinking is 
conscious,   relatively   slow,   primarily   verbal   and   intentional,   and   operates   by   a   person’s  
understanding of culturally transmitted rules of reasoning (Pacini and Epstein, 1999). Previous 
research has indicated that different cognitive styles have a different impact on individual 
production and implementation of novel and useful ideas  (Isaksen, 1987; Scott and Bruce, 
1994).  
 
Whereas most research on cognitive styles has focused on the individual level, analyzing the 
impact of individual information processing preferences and abilities on innovative behavior 
(e.g. idea-generation and creativity), strong indications are present that cognitive styles can also 
influence team behavior and effectiveness (Armstrong et al., 2011). Taggart (2001), for instance, 
found that cognitive styles influence the ability of teams to generate a variety of new ideas and 
the likelihood to identify problems. Relying on these insights from cognitive psychology, we 
expect   that   the   ability   of   teams   to   develop   new   products   might   depend   on   their   members’  
cognitive styles.  
 
In addition, some cognitive psychologists provide indications that the impact of thinking styles 
on performance might depend on the task environment and other contextual conditions  (Payne et 
al., 1990; Armstrong and Priola, 2001). Armstrong and Priola (2001), for instance, found that 
team performance is influenced by the fit between team cognitive styles and the nature of the 
work  environment.  In  line  with  these  observations,  we  expect  that  the  impact  of  teams’  cognitive  
styles might be differential in different innovation settings. In particular, we expect that 
analytical thinking in teams has a positive impact on project performance in exploitative settings, 
whereas in explorative settings, we expect intuitive thinking to have a positive performance 
impact. 
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The purpose of this study is to explore (i) the impact of NPD team cognitive styles on project 
performance (ii) in different types of innovation settings. In order to test our hypotheses, we rely 
on a unique dataset, comprising survey data from individual team-members of 95 NPD projects 
that were conducted in four Dutch manufacturing companies. Conducting general linear 
modeling   analyses,   our   findings   show   that   teams’   analytical   information   processing   has   a  
positive   effect   on   project   performance,   whereas   the   relationship   between   teams’   intuitive  
information processing and project performance is moderated by the degree of exploration of 
project activities.  
 
Our findings contribute to the literature on team innovation, suggesting that, next to demographic 
and functional characteristics, the composition of the team in terms of cognitive styles also 
significantly influences project performance. In particular, our study provides insights into the 
different effects of team thinking styles in different innovation settings. From a managerial 
perspective our findings provide valuable recommendations on how to compose NPD teams for 
different kinds of innovation activities (i.e. exploitative versus explorative innovation activities). 
Our data suggest that project managers should choose teams with strong analytical and weak 
intuitive processing for projects with high degrees of exploitation. In projects with high degrees 
of explorative activities, project performance benefits from teams with high levels of both 
intuitive and analytical processing of information. 
 
This paper is structured in five sections. First, we rely on insights from cognitive psychology and 
dual processing theory to develop our hypotheses. Second, the methodology is discussed. Third, 
the results of the analyses are presented. Finally, we point to the main implications of the 
findings,  discuss  the  study’s  main  limitations,  and  suggest  avenues  for  future  research. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Psychologists from various fields have proposed two fundamentally different thinking styles 
including intuitive and analytic modes of processing information (Epstein et al., 1996). Intuitive 
thinking can also be labeled as experiential, automatic, heuristic, associative, holistic and 
impulsive (Evans, 2008). Analytic thinking can also be characterized as rational, controlled, 
rules-based, conscious and reflective (Evans, 2008). Whereas previous studies conceptualized 
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both processing modes as opposing ends of a continuum (e.g. Allinson and Hayes, 1996), more 
recent studies have provided evidence that the two modes of processing have an orthogonal 
relationship (Kozhevnikov, 2007). According to dual process theory, people can be intuitive and 
rational at the same time (Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini and Epstein, 1999). According to this view 
(Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich and West, 2003), both thinking styles operate in an 
independent, parallel, and interactive manner (Kahneman, 2003). Together both systems 
contribute to behavior, with their relative contributions varying from none at all to complete 
dominance by either one of the modes (Pacini and Epstein, 1999). One of the most elaborated 
dual process theories is the cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) developed by Epstein 
(1994) (Evans, 2008). This theory assumes that people process information in two different 
modes. Analytical processing is identified by terms such as rational, deliberative, propositional, 
and extensional, whereas intuitive processing is described by terms such as experiential, 
automatic, intuitive, narrative, and natural (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994). According to CEST, 
individuals apprehend reality by these two interactive, parallel processing systems. The rational 
system is a deliberative, verbally mediated, primarily conscious analytical system that functions 
by a person's understanding of conventionally established rules of logic and evidence. The 
experiential system operates in an automatic, holistic manner, is intimately associated with the 
experience of affect, and is able to generalize and to construct relatively complex models for 
organizing experience and directing behavior by the use of prototypes, metaphors, scripts, and 
narratives (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994). These are independent systems that operate in parallel 
and interact to produce behavior and conscious thought (Epstein, 2003). 
 
Several scholars have stressed the importance of cognitive style to better understand 
organizational behavior and studied its relevance and consequences in contexts such as team 
composition and training and development (e.g. Kirton, 1989; McHale and Flegg, 1985; Ash, 
1986; Mitchell et al., 2004; Armstrong and Hird, 2009). Previous studies provide first indications 
that cognitive styles influence innovation behavior. Scott and Bruce (1994), for instance, found 
that individuals do not need to be highly intuitive problem solvers to be innovative, but that 
being systematic problem solvers inhibited high levels of innovative behavior. Results of a recent 
study by De Visser (2011) demonstrated that thinking styles of individuals may be indicative for 
their tendency toward explorative or exploitative innovation behavior. However, most of these 
34 
 
studies are on the individual level of analysis. Secondly, the few empirical studies that focus on 
innovation teams (e.g. West and Anderson, 1996; Miron-Spektor et al., 2011) concentrate on 
single project outputs (e.g. idea generation, project output novelty) and do not investigate the 
impact of team cognitive style on overall performance of the innovation project. Finally, these 
studies do not take into account contextual factors, such as the radicalness of the project. In this 
paper, we therefore develop hypotheses on the impact of team analytical and intuitive cognitive 
styles on overall NPD project performance in different innovation settings. 
 
The relationship between thinking styles and task performance seems to be influenced by the 
context in which activities take place. Both individual and team performance seem to be 
contingent on the degree of match between thinking style and requirements of the task.  
Empirical research has shown that individuals with a strong analytic thinking style tend to be 
more task oriented and prefer more structured, less ambiguous environments in which they can 
function within existing rules and procedures (Armstrong et al., 2011; Kirton; 1976; Cools et al., 
2009). Individuals with a strong intuitive thinking style, on the other hand, have been shown to 
favor less structure and more ambiguity in their work environment in which they can work 
autonomously and in freedom from rules and regulations (Kirton, 1976; Cools et al., 2009). 
Consequently, Scott and Bruce (1994) found that individuals with a strong intuitive thinking 
style are more likely to induce innovative behavior than those with a strong analytical style. 
Project-level studies have demonstrated similar results. Intuitive teams have been found to 
outperform their analytical counterparts when the nature of the work environment was 
unstructured and organic (Armstrong and Priola, 2001). Conversely, analytical teams have been 
found to outperform their intuitive counterparts when the nature of the work environments is 
relatively well structured and mechanistic (Priola et al., 2004). 
 
The NPD process is a multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing development processes that 
focus on the improvement of existing products (incremental NPD processes) as well as processes 
that focus on the generation of new products (radical NPD processes). Incremental technological 
innovations and innovations designed to meet the needs of existing customers are exploitative 
and build upon existing organizational knowledge. In contrast, radical innovations or those for 
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emergent customers or markets are exploratory, since they require new knowledge or departures 
from existing skills (Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991). 
 
Exploration is rooted in variance-increasing activities and creates futures that may be quite 
different   from   organizations’   past   routines   (Smith   and   Tushman,   2005).   It   is   associated   with  
experimentation, improvisation, and creativity (Chatman and Flynn, 2001; Rivkin and Siggelkow 
2003; Van de Ven et al. 1999). For these activities, we expect intuitive processing of information 
to be essential as it is characterized by overlapping separate domains of thought simultaneously, 
a lack of attention to existing rules and disciplinary boundaries, and an emphasis on imagery 
(Scott and Bruce, 1994). In general, exploration is associated with organic structures (Ancona et 
al. 2001, Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Lewin et al. 1999). These kinds of working environments 
are not preferred by analytic thinkers. Therefore we expect high levels of analytic thinking in 
teams to be counter-effective in projects with high levels of exploration. 
 
Hypothesis 1a 
In NPD projects with high exploration intensity,  the  relationship  between  teams’  intuitive  
information processing and project performance is positive 
 
Hypothesis 1b 
In  NPD  projects  with  high  exploration  intensity,  the  relationship  between  teams’  analytical  
information processing and project performance is negative 
 
Exploitation is rooted in variance-decreasing  activities  and  builds  on  organizations’  past  routines  
(Smith and Tushman, 2005). It is associated with efficiency, focus and standardization (Chatman 
and Flynn, 2001; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Van de Ven et al., 1999). For these activities, we 
expect analytic processing to be essential as it is based on habit, or following set routines, 
adherence to rules and disciplinary boundaries, and use of rationality and logic (Scott and Bruce, 
1994). As exploitation is associated with mechanistic structures and routinization (Ancona et al. 
2001, Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, Lewin et al. 1999), which do not fit with the working 
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environment preferred by intuitive thinkers, we expect high levels of intuitive thinking to be 
counter-effective in projects with low degrees of exploration. 
 
Hypothesis 2a 
In  NPD  projects  with  high  exploitation  intensity,  the  relationship  between  teams’  intuitive  
information processing and project performance is negative 
 
Hypothesis 2b 
In  NPD  projects  with  high  exploitation  intensity,  the  relationship  between  teams’  analytical  
information processing and project performance is positive 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
Our sampling was based on the method used by Gladstein et al. (1992). We studied 102 NPD 
teams in four technology companies in the rubber tires, sensors and controls, membrane 
technologies and pipeline systems industries. In these four companies, we were given access to 
their documentation system of all the NPD projects that had been conducted in the past five 
years. We also obtained time-accounting data of all projects, which enabled us to list the 
members of all of the teams that worked on these projects. We then verified with the project 
managers whether the members we selected were considered to be on the team. Each team was 
responsible for developing a product or product component in a project setting. The average 
group size was approximately 4. Of the 352 questionnaires distributed to team members, 261 
were returned (82%). Because we were analyzing at the group level, teams were included in the 
final sample only if at least two-thirds of the members responded. This reduced the number of 
teams in the final sample to 95. The average age of individuals in the sample was 40 of which 
96% male. Approximately 74% of the respondents in the sample were from engineering or 
research and development; the remaining 26% were primarily from manufacturing or marketing. 
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Measures 
Dependent variable: indicator of overall project performance 
In this study, we define project performance as the extent to which a team is able to meet 
established project objectives. To capture overall project performance, we adopted a 5-point 
Likert scale from Hoegl et al. (2004) who based them on scales used by Lechler (1997) and 
Hoegl and Gemuenden (2001). This scale consists of five items referring to project success, 
achievement of project goals, output quality, team satisfaction about project performance and top 
management satisfaction about project progress. All team members of each project were asked to 
evaluate project performance using this scale (Cronbach's alpha = 0.95). We computed an overall 
project performance variable by calculating the mean score of the individual factor scores of the 
team members.  
 
Independent variables: team analytical and intuitive processing 
To measure the degree to which NPD team members process information intuitively, we used the 
"Faith in intuition" scale (Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini and Epstein, 1999). We measured analytical 
processing of team members by the "Need for cognition" scale (Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini and 
Epstein, 1999). We selected the 7-point Likert scale items for both systems from the latest 
version of the "Need for cognition" and "Faith in intuition" instrument based on the highest 
factor loadings (Pacini and Epstein, 1999). We conducted confirmatory factor analysis of the 10 
items pertaining to intuitive and analytical processing on the sample of 123 individuals.  Due to 
low factor loadings (below 0.58) we deleted two items. Table 1 displays results of the 
hypothesized 2-factor model with significant factor loadings for the remaining 4 intuitive 
processing   (α=0.79)   and   the   4   analytical   processing   (α=0.80)   items.   The   goodness-of-fit 
measures indicate that the data fit the hypothesized model adequately. These findings provided 
strong support for the reliability and validity of our measurements for intuitive and analytical 
processing of NPD team members. We computed team intuitive and team analytical processing 
by calculating the mean scores on both scales of all team members. 
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Table 1: Results of confirmatory factor analysis 
Item Intuitive 
processing 
Analytical 
processing 
I like to rely on my intuitive impressions 0.7141  
Using my gut feeling usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life 0.7476  
I believe in trusting my hunches 0.5935  
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action 0.7388  
I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something (reverse coded)  0.6913 
I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking  0.6441 
I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people  0.7664 
I have a logical mind  0.8419 
   
Bentler’s  Comparative  Fit  Index  0.9715 
Bentler  and  Bonett’s  Non-normed Index 0.9557 
Bentler  and  Bonett’s  Normed  Fit  Index  0.9187 
Chi-Square Test (p-Value) 26.4801 
 
  
Moderator: exploration 
In this study we expect the degree of exploration activities to moderate the relationship between 
team cognitive styles and overall NPD project performance. Exploration includes activities such 
as fundamental research, experimentation, and search (Benner and Tushman, 2003). In order to 
measure the degree of exploration in NPD projects, we asked all team members of each project 
which percentage of total project time was dedicated to explorative activities such as 
fundamental research, experimentation and prototyping (Tushman and Smith, 2002). We created 
the  exploration  variable  by  calculating  the  mean  of  all  team  members’  scores. 
 
Control variables 
For new product development teams, organization tenure and the mix of functional specialties 
are likely to be of particular importance to project performance (Gladstein et al., 1992). 
Organization tenure has been related to the frequency of communication (Zenger and Lawrence, 
1989),   social   integration   (O’Reilly   et   al.,   1989)   and   performance   (O’Reilly   and   Flatt,   1989).  
Given the technical nature and complexity of the product development process, the effect of 
tenure is likely to influence the way the NPD team operates (Gladstein et al., 1992) and affect 
project performance. We therefore controlled for tenure effects by measuring company 
experience of teams. We asked all team members about the tenure in the firm and calculated the 
mean company experience for each team in years. An NPD team might be made up entirely of 
39 
 
individuals from research and development or may also involve members of manufacturing, 
marketing. For product development teams functional diversity has been shown to have 
significant effect on project performance (Brettel et al., 2011; Gladstein et al., 1992). We 
controlled for performance effects of cross-functionality by including a dummy variable that 
indicates whether multiple departments were involved in the NPD teams. Finally we controlled 
for company effects as project performance of NPD teams might be nested in their specific 
company contexts. 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Harman’s   single   factor   test   as   suggested   by   Podsakoff   and   Organ   (1986)   provided   initial  
evidence that common method bias was not a major problem in our study, as only 28,6% of the 
variance was explained by a single factor solution. Addressing the potential for multicollinearity, 
we standardized the variables and found that the VIF scores (see table 2) did not exceed 10. This 
indicates that multicollinearity is not a major concern (Hair et al., 1995). 
 
Table 2: VIF scores 
Variable VIF 
Cross-functionality 1.15463 
ZExploration 1.34665 
ZCompany experience 1.15818 
ZIntuitive processing 1.35492 
ZAnalytical processing 1.76873 
ZIntuitive processing*ZExploration 1.29129 
ZAnalytical processing*ZExploration 1.62491 
 
 
An overview of the descriptive statistics on the continuous variables can be found in table 3. As 
we see in table 3, the variable analytical processing negatively correlates with company 
experience. Also, a significant correlation between the two processing styles and exploration can 
be observed. Finally, analytical and intuitive processing in teams are significantly correlated.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlations (two-tailed) 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Overall 
project 
performance 
Company 
experience 
Analytical 
processing 
Intuitive 
processing 
Exploration 
        
Overall project 
performance 
3.5169 .7543 1     
Company experience 14.2215 8.1317 .040 1    
Analytical processing 5.2942 .8593 .108 -.226** 1   
Intuitive processing 4.5397 .6850 .138 -.016 .283*** 1  
Exploration 54.8815 23.6567 -.141 -.025 .371*** .254** 1 
*p<0.1  
**p<0.05  
***p<0.01 
    
   
 
Impact of intuitive and analytical processing on project performance 
Table 4 summarizes the findings of the General Linear Modeling analyses whereby overall 
project performance acts as the dependent variable. It can be observed that there is a significant 
interaction effect between intuitive processing and exploration on overall project performance. 
Figure 1 visualizes this interaction effect. In line with our first hypothesis, in NPD projects with 
higher degrees of exploration, intuitive processing has a significant positive effect on overall 
project performance. In addition, intuitive processing has a significant negative effect on overall 
project performance in NPD projects with lower degrees of exploration, which is also in line 
with what we hypothesized. In contrast to what we hypothesized, our results show no significant 
interaction effect between analytical processing and exploration. However, a direct positive 
effect of analytical processing on overall project performance can be observed. Our data thus 
suggest that team analytical thinking has a positive effect on overall project performance, 
independent of the degree of exploration of the NPD project that is conducted. It can also be 
observed that cross-functionality has a positive impact on overall project performance. 
Furthermore, the results show that company C significantly underperforms compared to 
company D. Finally, we did not observe significant company experience effects for overall 
project performance. 
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Table 4: Results of General Linear Modeling analyses-dependent variable: overall project 
performance (N=95) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept .423* .378* .350 .336 .323 
Company A -.231 -.142 -.123 -.089 -.206 
Company B .005 .129 .166 .199 .047 
Company C -.881** -.961*** -.731** -.778** -.785** 
Company D reference reference reference reference reference 
Cross-functionality=0 -.403* -.376* -.485** -.377* -.405* 
Cross-functionality=1 reference reference reference reference reference 
ZCompany experience -.106 -.059 -.071 -.045 .006 
ZAnalytical processing  .232**  .175 .285** 
ZIntuitive processing   .173* .123 .035 
ZExploration    -.085 -.124 
ZAnalytical processing *ZExploration    -.090  
ZIntuitive processing*ZExploration     .242*** 
 
     
R Squared / Adjusted R Squared .177 / .131 .222 / .169 .204 / .149 .246 / .166 .302 / .228 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
     
 
     Figure 1: Effects of intuitive processing on overall project performance at different levels 
of exploration 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this section, we first present the main implications of our findings. We rely on our findings to 
discuss the relevance of cognitive styles in NPD teams, point to the main limitations of our study 
and suggest interesting avenues for future research. 
 
Many scholars (e.g. Gupta et al., 1987; Olson et al., 2001) have emphasized the benefits of cross-
functional integration structures in product development projects. In line with their research, our 
data confirm the positive relationship between NPD team composition of various functional 
backgrounds and project performance. However, the results of our analyses also point at the 
relevance of psychological factors that have received less attention in the NPD literature. In 
particular, our data suggest that team cognitive styles have significant predictive value in 
explaining project performance. Our analyses of the impact of analytical and intuitive thinking 
styles on performance thus indicate that organizations might benefit from configuring teams not 
only based on functional backgrounds, but also based on thinking styles of team members. 
 
These findings are relevant to management of NPD as we found evidence that the effectiveness 
of thinking styles in teams is different among different kinds of innovation setting. This implies 
that teams can be configured in terms of thinking styles for optimal performance of different 
types of projects. We observed that high levels of intuitive processing in NPD teams have 
significant positive impact on overall performance, whereas this thinking style has a significant 
negative impact on project performance in less explorative settings. At the same time, we 
observed that team analytical processing has a positive impact on project performance, 
independent of the explorative degree of the project activities. 
 
Olson (1985) proposed that analytical processing would be especially effective in the 
implementation phase of a project. Our data show that analytical processing has a positive effect 
on project performance in exploitative, less explorative projects where relative focus lies on the 
implementation of existing knowledge. Previous research has indicated that individuals that 
heavily process information in an analytical way do not prefer working in environments that are 
unstructured and ambiguous (Armstrong et al., 2011; Kirton; 1976; Cools et al., 2009). Also, 
teams with strong analytical processing have been found to perform worse in these settings 
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compared to teams with lower analytical processing (Armstrong and Priola, 2001). Therefore we 
expected a negative relationship between team analytical processing and project performance in 
explorative settings. However, our results indicate that team analytical processing is positively 
related to performance, both in exploitative and explorative projects. This might be explained by 
the NPD setting of our study, where all projects typically include solving technological and 
mathematical problems which require analytical processing (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994). 
Strong analytical processing in NPD projects might therefore also have a positive effect on 
performance in more explorative settings.  
 
At the same time, our results indicate that the effectiveness of NPD teams seems to be contingent 
on the fit between intuitive thinking style and the task of the team. This is in line with findings 
by scholars who emphasized that a match between job demands and thinking style is expected to 
yield positive outcome (Fuller and Kaplan, 2004; Sadler-Smith and Badger, 1998). Our findings 
also confirm the points earlier made by Burns and Stalker (1994), who argued that different 
thinking styles might be required to optimize overall performance when interacting in organic 
and mechanistic work environments (Burns and Stalker, 1994).  
 
Our findings suggest that intuitive processing has a negative impact on project performance in 
less explorative projects. In these settings, project goals and relationships and linkages between 
product components and core concepts are relatively clear. Here intuitive processing and 
associated divergent thinking might only slow down project results. Previous research has 
already pointed at the limitations of intuitive processing. In numerous studies that have examined 
judgmental processes, people relying on intuitive thinking ignored basic statistical concepts 
(Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Kahneman et al., 1982; Nisbett et al., 1983). This may explain the 
negative effects of intuitive processing that our data suggest. 
 
At the same time, though, intuitive thinking seems to be complementary to analytical thinking in 
the  uncertain  settings  of  more  explorative  projects  where  relationships  between  a  new  product’s  
components and core concepts become more complex. This is in line with Olson (1985) who 
proposed that intuitive thinking would be more effective for idea generation, which is relatively 
44 
 
important in more explorative projects. In these settings, optimal project performance seems to 
be achieved when both levels of analytical processing and intuitive processing are high. 
 
Radical, highly explorative NPD projects include drawing new relationships between new 
product components and core concepts. The unconscious, intuitive mode of processing 
information seems to be of vital importance in making such associations. The human ability to 
save highly complex relationships in its working memory and process them in a rational and 
conscious manner is very limited (Van de Ven, 1996). Multiple empirical studies have 
demonstrated that most individuals lack the capability and inclination to deal with this 
complexity (Tversky and Kahneman; 1974; Johnson, 1983). Most people have short spans of 
attention and can retain raw data in short-term memory for only a few seconds (Van de Ven, 
1996). In exploitative settings, where complexity is limited, processing information in the 
analytical mode seems to be effective, but in more complex and explorative settings, working 
memory is not sufficient. Then analytical processing of working memory data has to be 
complemented with intuitive processing by linking it to pre-existing schemas and world views 
that an individual has stored in long-term memory (Simon, 1947; Evans, 2008). 
 
Managerial implications 
Our study has practical implications for managers of NPD projects. Our results have 
demonstrated that including multiple functional backgrounds in a team has a positive effect on 
project performance. However, our data also show significant effects of composing NPD teams 
in terms of thinking styles. In organizations where potential team members share the same 
functional expertise, project managers might consider selecting team members based on their 
information processing style, for instance by using   the   “need   for   cognition”   and   “faith   in  
intuition  scales”  developed  by  Pacini  and  Epstein  (1999).  Based  on  our  findings  and  insights,  we  
argue that for optimal overall project performance, managers should compose NPD teams with 
mostly analytical thinkers for their incremental, less explorative projects, and compose teams 
with high-level intuitive and high-level analytical thinking for more radical, explorative NPD 
projects. 
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Limitations and future research  
We see several limitations of our study that provide interesting avenues for further research on 
cognitive styles in NPD teams. From a methodological perspective, it has to be noted that the 
findings are based on subjective perceptions of project performance. Using more objective data 
might prove beneficial. Moreover, inherent to survey-based research, the study is cross-sectional. 
Project performance was measured only at one point in time. This approach thereby neglects 
potential dynamic effects of cognitive styles on project performance. To accommodate this effect 
appropriately would require a longitudinal data set. 
 
Although we were able to examine the degree to which thinking styles were present in NPD 
teams, we have not paid attention to their effect on performance throughout the stages of a 
project. Previous research, however, suggests that the effects of thinking styles may differ 
depending on the stage in the NPD process. Olson (1985), for instance, proposed that individuals 
with a more intuitive cognitive style would be more effective in the initiation phase were the 
focus is on idea generation, whereas those with a more analytical style would be better in the 
implementation phase where ideas come into practice. Also, the effects of cognitive style may be 
dependent on the functional background of team members. It would therefore be relevant for 
future research to provide more fine-grained insights into the implications of thinking styles of 
team members with different functional backgrounds in different phases of the project. 
 
It also needs to be stressed that we only examined overall project performance. However, project 
performance is a multi-dimensional construct. For a product development team charged with 
designing a specific part of a larger product, several properties may be important, such as 
including functionality, manufacturability and dimensional integrity (Hoegl et al., 2004). As 
analytical and intuitive processing may have different effects on these different dimensions of 
performance (Miron-Spektor et al., 2011), we suggest that future studies on thinking styles in 
NPD teams distinguish between more dimensions of project performance. 
 
Despite these limitations, this study seems to have provided valuable insights in the implications 
of NPD team composition of cognitive styles for project performance. We hope that these 
findings will help project managers in optimizing their teams and that the suggestions provided 
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herein for future research might stimulate academic research in further examining the 
implications of different thinking styles in new product development.  
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4 
STRUCTURAL AMBIDEXTERITY IN NPD PROCESSES: 
A FIRM-LEVEL ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF 
DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION STRUCTURES ON 
INNOVATION PERFORMANCE2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
New product development (NPD) is seen as crucial for the long-term survival and growth of the 
firm (Baumol, 2002; Schumpeter, 1939). During the past decades, scholars have therefore 
increasingly studied the NPD process within firms (for an overview of this research, see 
Damanpour, 1991; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Ernst, 2002). In these studies, the structural 
design of the NPD process has been recognized as one of the critical success factors to arrive at 
successful innovation (Cooper, 2003). In particular, the implementation of structural mechanisms 
such as cross-functional integration structures (Griffin, 1997; Pittiglio et al., 1995; Song et al., 
1997), stage-gate processes (Cooper, 1996; Cooper et al., 2004), and formalized NPD procedures 
(Kerssens-van Drongelen and De Weerd-Nederhof, 1999; Lilly and Porter, 2003) have been 
found to positively influence the innovation performance of firms. 
 
                                                          
2 This chapter is based on previous papers: 
 
De Visser, M., de Weerd-Nederhof, P., Faems, D., Song, M., van Looy, B., Visscher, K., 2008. Ambidexterity in 
NPD processes: an exploration of performance effects of - differentiated - organizational practices. Presented at the 
R&D Management conference, Ottawa, Canada, June 17-20. 
 
De Visser, M., de Weerd-Nederhof, P., Faems, D., Song, M., Van Looy, B., Visscher, K., 2009.  Structural 
ambidexterity in NPD processes: the impact of differentiated integration structures on innovation performance. In 
Best Paper Proceedings of the Academy of Management Conference, Chicago, USA, August 7-11. 
 
De Visser, M., De Weerd-Nederhof, P., Faems, D., Song, M., Van Looy, Visscher, K., 2010. Structural 
ambidexterity in NPD processes: The impact of - differentiated - structures on firm-level innovation performance. 
Technovation, 30, 5-6, 291-299. 
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At the same time, it is increasingly recognized that the NPD process is a multidimensional 
phenomenon, encompassing development processes that focus on the improvement of existing 
products (incremental NPD processes) as well as processes that focus on the generation of new 
products (radical NPD processes). Moreover, several scholars (Olson et al., 1995; Olson et al., 
2001; Song and Xie, 2000) have provided evidence that, within a particular NPD project, the 
product innovativeness moderates the relationship between the effectiveness of the integration 
structure (i.e. formal versus cross-functional integration structure) and the performance of the 
NPD project. However, these studies have solely focused on the project level (Sánchez and 
Pérez, 2003). As a result, we do not know whether firms tend to apply different kinds of 
integration structures for different kinds of NPD processes and how the application of particular 
integration structures in particular NPD processes influences firm-level innovation performance. 
In this paper, we therefore conduct a firm-level assessment of the impact of different kinds of 
integration structures (i.e. functional versus cross-functional) in different kinds of NPD processes 
(i.e. incremental versus radical) on different kinds of firm innovation performance (i.e. derivative 
versus breakthrough innovation performance). 
 
Based on a survey study of 155 US firms, we observe that most firms apply similar integration 
structures for their incremental and radical NPD processes. At the same time, though, we find 
strong evidence that 1) firms that apply a cross-functional integration structure for the radical 
NPD process perform significantly better in terms of breakthrough innovation performance than 
firms that apply a functional integration structure for the radical NPD process and, 2) firms that 
apply a functional integration structure for the incremental NPD process perform significantly 
better in terms of derivative innovation performance than firms that apply a cross-functional 
integration structure for the incremental NPD process. In other words, our findings point to the 
relevance   of   adopting   structural   ambidexterity   (Gibson   and   Birkinshaw   2004;;   O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2004) where firms make an explicit distinction between incremental and radical NPD 
processes and organize them in a different way. The remainder of this paper consists of 4 
sections. First, we situate our study in the existing NPD literature. Second, we discuss our 
methodology. Subsequently, we present our main result. Finally, we point to the main theoretical 
and managerial implications of our findings, discuss the main limitations of our study and 
suggest interesting avenues for future research. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
A project-level assessment of the integration-performance relationship 
Numerous scholars (e.g. Cormican and   O’Sullivan,   2004;;   Griffin,   1997,   Griffin   and   Hauser,  
1992; Gupta et al., 1986; Pinto and Pinto, 1990) have examined the structure of the NPD process 
and how it influences NPD performance. These studies emphasize that firms can choose between 
different kinds of integration structures for the NPD process. On the one hand, firms can choose 
for a cross-functional integration structure, where specialists of different departments (R&D, 
manufacturing and marketing) are brought together within a single team structure for a particular 
NPD project (Griffin, 1997). The antithesis of a cross-functional integration approach to NPD is 
the functional approach, where work is done by various specialized departments independently 
(Song et al., 1998). 
 
In the NPD literature (e.g. Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Ernst, 2002; Garcia et al., 2008; Griffin, 
1997; Lee and Chen, 2007; Imai et al., 1985; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991), the advantages of cross-
functional integration structures for NPD projects have been emphasized. Cross-functional 
project teams foster interdepartmental communication and co-operation which in turn facilitates 
coordination (Ernst, 2002). In addition, the presence of an NPD team, which is composed of 
members with various functional specializations, facilitates the access to a diverse pool of 
information, which increases the probability of successful innovation (Balbontin et al., 1999). 
Such cross-functional structure also allows engaging in overlapping development stages, which 
in-turn speeds up the development process (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). 
 
Adopting a contingency perspective, some scholars (Moenaert et al., 1995; Olson et al., 1995; 
Song et al., 1998; Song and Xie, 2000), however, have argued that the relationship between 
cross-functional integration and innovation performance is more complex. In particular, they 
provide evidence that certain contingencies may moderate the relationship between the 
effectiveness of cross-functional integration structures and the outcomes of NPD projects. The 
degree of project innovativeness has been recognized as an important contingency in this respect 
(Olson et al., 1995; Song and Xie, 2000). Within NPD processes, the degree of innovativeness 
can vary between incremental and radical (Dewar and Dutton, 1985; Tushman and Anderson, 
1986). The objective of incremental NPD processes is to improve existing products through 
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conducting exploitative activities such as optimization, standardization and refinement. Within 
radical NPD processes, the objective is to generate really new products through conducting 
explorative activities such as fundamental research, experimenting and prototyping (Tushman 
and Smith, 2002). 
 
Relying on resource dependence theory, scholars (e.g. Gupta et al., 1986; Olson et al., 1995; 
Olson et al., 2001; Ruekert and Walker, 1987) have argued that product innovativeness might 
influence the need for cross-functional integration structures in NPD projects. In particular, it is 
emphasized that radical innovation projects are associated with high levels of external and 
internal uncertainty, triggering substantial task interdependence between the involved project 
members. To address such increased interdependence levels, more participative coordination 
structures such as cross-functional teams become necessary. In contrast, incremental innovation 
projects typically are characterized by relatively low levels of uncertainty. In such circumstances, 
task interdependence levels are likely to be relatively low, reducing the need for participative 
coordination structures. 
 
Adopting insights from information processing theory, other scholars have come to similar 
conclusions. They argued that, within radical innovation projects, the need to bring together 
organizational members with diverse backgrounds is relatively high. Schön (1963), for instance, 
argued that novel solutions and insights ask for problem-defining and problem-solving 
interaction sequences, whereby multiple opinions and viewpoints become integrated into a new 
synthesis or artifact. Similarly, Pelz and Andrews (1966) came to the conclusion that differences 
in approaches between individuals may provide the intellectual   jostling   or   ‘dither’   which is 
needed for really creative work. In addition, scholars have pointed to cross-functional integration 
structures as an effective coordination mechanism to bring together members of diverse 
backgrounds. Allen (2001) and Hargadon (2003), for instance, emphasize that, when domain 
specialists are integrated in a cross-functional team, these specialists can contribute to connecting 
previously unrelated knowledge sets, stimulating breakthrough innovation. 
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At the same time, though, indications are present that, because of such increased diversity, cross-
functional structures might be less beneficial for NPD projects of a more incremental nature. 
Bringing together members of diverse backgrounds also leads to conflicting expectations and an 
excess of opinions from different individuals (Song et al., 1998). This might lead to disruption of 
existing work routines and difficult decision making, which in-turn hampers the ability for 
continuous optimization and refinement of existing products and technologies (Song and Xie, 
2000). 
 
On the level of individual NPD projects, first empirical evidence has been provided that supports 
the moderating impact of product innovativeness on the relationship between the effectiveness of 
cross-functional integration structures and project performance. Examining 45 NPD projects, 
Olson et al. (1995) provided evidence that product innovativeness moderates the relationship 
between the effectiveness of coordination structures and the project success. In particular, they 
observed that the better the fit between the newness of the product concept and the participatory 
nature of the integration structure used the better the outcomes of the development process in 
terms of 1) objective measures of product and team performance, 2) the attitudes of team 
members toward the process, and 3) the efficiency and timeliness of the new product 
development process. More recently, other scholars have provided more fine-grained 
assessments of the moderating impact of product innovativeness on the relationship between 
integration structures and the performance of single NPD projects. 
 
Based on data from 788 Japanese and 612 US NPD projects, Song and Xie (2000) found that 
product innovativeness significantly moderates the integration-performance relationship in 
Japanese firms but not in US firms. Relying on fine-grained data from 34 NPD processes, Olson 
et al. (2001) observed that 1) late stage cooperation between marketing and operations, and R&D 
and operations is a key determinant of project performance for innovative products but not for 
non-innovative products, and 2) early stage cooperation between marketing and operations is 
associated with superior performance for low innovation projects but is also associated with poor 
performance for highly innovative projects. 
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Toward a firm-level assessment of the integration-performance relationship 
Although previous studies have provided valuable insights into how product innovativeness 
moderates the integration-performance relationship at the individual project level, a firm-level 
assessment of the impact of different integration structures on innovation performance is lacking. 
We therefore do not know whether single firms tend to use different kinds of integration 
structures for different kinds of NPD processes or rather prefer to apply a standardized 
integration regime across different kinds of NPD processes. In the NPD literature, several 
scholars (e.g. Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2008; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; 
O’Reilly  and  Tushman,  2004;;  Tushman and Anderson, 1986;;  Tushman  and  O’Reilly,  1996;;  Van  
Looy et al., 2005) seem to suggest the relevance of adopting different structures for different 
kinds of innovation activities. In particular, these scholars argued that, if a company wants to 
excel in both improving existing products (i.e. derivative innovation performance) and 
generating new products (i.e. breakthrough innovation performance), it should apply structural 
ambidexterity, meaning that it explicitly separates incremental and radical NPD processes and 
organize them in a different way. Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1 
Firms apply different integration structures (i.e. functional versus cross-functional) for different 
kinds of NPD processes (i.e. incremental versus radical NPD processes) 
 
In addition, because of the previous focus on single projects, we lack empirical data on how the 
application of specific integration structures in specific kinds of NPD processes influences the 
ability of firms to generate sales from product improvements (i.e. derivative innovation 
performance) and from radically new products (i.e. breakthrough innovation performance). We 
therefore assess the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Firms that apply a functional integration structure for their incremental NPD process display 
significantly higher levels of derivative innovation performance than firms that apply a cross-
functional integration structure for their incremental NPD process. 
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Hypothesis 3 
Firms that apply a cross-functional integration structure for their radical NPD process display 
significantly higher levels of breakthrough innovation performance than firms that apply a 
functional integration structure for their radical NPD process. 
 
METHODOLODY 
Data and sample 
Our sample population consisted of 500 randomly selected non-service US firms listed in the 
World Business Directory. We sent a pre-survey letter to all 500 firms requesting pre-approval of 
participation. A total of 186 firms agreed to participate and provided a contact person, while 36 
companies declined to participate; 42 letters were returned due to invalid contact person or 
addresses, and 236 companies did not respond. 
 
In  administering  the  final  survey,  we  followed  Dillman’s  (1978)  total  design  method  for  survey  
research. The first mailing packet included a personalized letter, the survey, a priority postage-
paid envelope with an individually typed return-address label, and a list of research reports 
available to participants. The package was sent by priority mail to 422 firms (186 firms agreeing 
to participate and 236 non-responding firms from the pre-survey). We asked the contact person 
(president, division manager, strategic business manager, new business program manager, or 
R&D director) to distribute the questionnaire to a manager who has been involved in developing 
new products in their organization or who has knowledge of overall new product programs in 
their organization. 
 
To increase the response rate, we sent four follow-up mailings to the companies. One week after 
the mailing, we sent a follow-up letter. Two weeks after the first follow-up, we sent a second 
package with the same content as the first package to all non-responding companies. After two 
additional follow-up letters, we received usable questionnaires from 155 firms, representing a 
response rate of 38% (155/422). 
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The industries represented in the final samples are: Chemicals and Related Products; Electronic 
and Electrical Equipment; Pharmaceutical, Drugs and Medicines; Industrial Machinery and 
Equipment; Telecommunications Equipment; Semiconductors & Computer Related Products; 
and Instruments and Related Products. The annual sales of respondent firms ranged from 
$500,000 to $461 million and the total number of employees in the business unit ranged from 11 
people to 1017 people. 
 
Measures 
Dependent variables: indicators of innovation performance 
Following Faems et al. (2005) we use the composition of turnover in 2005 in order to make a 
distinction between derivative and breakthrough innovation performance. The proportion of 
turnover in 2005 attributed to breakthrough new products that were introduced during the last 
three years is regarded as an indication of breakthrough innovation performance. Likewise, the 
percentage of turnover in 2005 attributed to improved products that were introduced during the 
last three years is seen as an indicator of derivative innovation performance. In line with the 
study of Faems et al. (2005), our analyses include the logarithm of 1 + the proportion of turnover 
attributed to 1) breakthrough new products and 2) improved products in order to obtain a normal 
distribution. 
 
Independent variable: integration structure. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine to what extent the integration structure of the 
incremental and radical NPD process influences the innovation performance of firms. Based on 
previous research on the structuring of NPD processes (i.e. Griffin, 1997; Griffin and Page, 
1996) we made a distinction between two different ways to structure the NPD process: 1) 
functional integration structure; and 2) cross-functional integration structure. In addition, we 
made an explicit distinction between the incremental and radical NPD process. In particular, we 
first asked respondents to indicate which kind of structure they applied for organizing the 
incremental development processes. Subsequently, we asked respondents to indicate the applied 
structure for organizing the radical development processes. Based on these questions, we 
constructed two dummy variables, representing the applied integration structure within 1) the 
incremental NPD processes and 2) the radical NPD processes. If firms applied a functional 
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integration structure for their incremental/radical NPD process, they received a value of 0. If 
firms applied a cross-functional integration structure for their incremental/radical NPD process, 
they received a value of 1. 
 
Control variables 
Previous studies (e.g. Cooper, 1996, 1999, 2001; Griffin, 1997) have provided evidence that 
firms can differ in terms of the extent to which their NPD strategy is professionalized. Moreover, 
these studies indicate that the professionalization of the NPD strategy   might   impact   a   firm’s  
innovation performance. For instance, Cooper et al. (2004) identified a clear and well-
communicated NPD strategy as one of the most important performance drivers for new product 
success. In this study, we therefore measured the professionalization  of  a  firm’s  NPD  strategy.  In  
particular, we asked respondents to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale to what extent they applied 
the following 5 strategy-related NPD best practices as identified by Cooper et al. (2004); 1) the 
role of NPD in achieving business goals is clearly articulated 2) there is a formally stated NPD 
strategy 3) we have clearly defined goals for all of our individual new products 4) systematic 
portfolio management is in place 5) the project portfolios are aligned with the business strategy. 
Reliability   analysis   indicated   that   these   5   items   represented   one   single   construct   (Cronbach’s  
alpha  0.72).  We  therefore  built  the  construct  ’Professionalization  of  NPD  strategy’  by  calculating  
the mean of the scores on these 5 items. 
 
In order to control for industry effects, we made a distinction between sectors based on the 
Standard Industrial Classification. Table I displays the frequencies and percentages of the sectors 
in our data collection. 
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In the NPD literature, considerable attention is devoted to the relationship between firm size and 
innovation performance (e.g. Schumpeter, 1939; Freeman, 1994). Therefore, we included the 
variable  “firm  size”,  measured  by  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  total  number  of  employees. 
 
RESULTS 
In this section, we discuss the results of our analyses. As one dependent variable (breakthrough 
innovation performance) contained a substantial amount of left-censored values, we relied on 
Tobit regressions (McDonald and Moffit, 1980) to analyze hypotheses 2 and 3. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table II and Table III provide an overview of the frequencies on integration structure variables 
for both the incremental and radical NPD processes. These frequency tables clearly indicate that 
for both the incremental and radical NPD processes, cross-functional integration structures are 
much more common than functional integration structures. 
  
Table I: Sector frequencies and percentages
Sector Frequency Percent
Automotive 20 12.9
Chemical 13 8.4
Electronics 7 4.5
Instruments 12 7.7
Leather 16 10.3
Metal 48 31.0
Stone 18 11.6
Textile 17 11.0
Other 4 2.6
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An overview of the descriptive statistics on the continuous variables can be found in table IV. 
The means for the variables breakthrough innovation performance and incremental innovation 
performance are respectively 3.07 and 3.39. Taking into account that this study uses logarithmic 
transformation for these variables, the implication is that, on average, the respondents attributed 
25.91% of their turnover to breakthrough products and 31.69% to improved products. As we see 
in table IV, the control variable Professionalization of NPD significantly correlates with the 
dependent variables. In the next two paragraphs we will further elaborate on these relationships. 
 
Table II: Incremental NPD process type (frequencies and percentages)
Incremental NPD process Frequency Percent
Functional integration structure 20 12.9
Cross-functional integration 
structure 135 87.1
Total 155 100
Table III: Radical NPD process type (frequencies and percentages)
Radical NPD process Frequency Percent
functional integration structure 40 25.8
cross-functional integration structure 115 74.2
Total 155
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The application of different integration structures for different NPD processes 
Table V shows which kind of combinations of integration structures firms apply for their 
incremental and radical NPD processes. This table clearly illustrates that the majority of the 
responding firms apply a standardized approach for structuring different kinds of NPD processes. 
In particular, 67.1% of the firms rely on cross-functional integration structures for both their 
incremental and radical NPD processes. At the same time, we observe that only 27.1% of the 
firms under study deploy a differentiated integration structure for their incremental and radical 
NPD processes. Our first hypothesis is therefore not supported by our data. 
 
 
 
  
Table IV: Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation
Derivative 
innovation 
performance
Break-
through 
innovation 
performance
Log 
(Company 
size)
Professio-
nalization 
NPD 
strategy
Incremental  
innovation performance
3.3889 .46088 1
Breakthrough
innovation performance
3.0660 .87942 -.648** 1
Log(Company size) 5.2658 1.33460 -.023 -.001 1
Professionalization
NPD strategy
4.6710 .98554 -.269** .248** .079 1
* correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)
Table V: Combinations of integration structures
Radical NPD Process
Functional 
integration structure
Cross-functional 
integration structure
Incremental NPD 
Process
Functional 
integration structure
9
(5.8 %)
11
(7.1 %)
Cross-functional 
integration structure
31
(20 %)
104
(67.1 %)
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Impact of integration structure on derivative innovation performance 
Table VI summarizes the findings of the Tobit analysis whereby derivative innovation 
performance acts as the dependent variable. 
 
 
 
In line with hypothesis 2, we find that organizations that rely on a cross-functional integration 
structure for their incremental NPD process perform significantly lower on derivative innovation 
performance than organizations that apply a functional integration structure for their incremental 
NPD. It can also be observed that professionalization of NPD has a negative impact on derivative 
innovation performance. Finally, we did not observe significant industry or size effects for 
derivative innovation performance. 
 
  
Table VI: Results of Tobit analysis – dependent variable: Derivative innovation 
performance (N = 155; Pseudo R2= 0.13)
Variable Estimate St Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 4.2963 0.2182 387.55 <.0001
Industry: (Reference category : Automotive)
     - Other -0.1124 0.2348 0.23 0.6323
     - Chemical -0.1297 0.1537 0.71 0.3989
     - Electronics -0.2905 0.1896 2.35 0.1255
     - Instruments -0.2230 0.1572 2.01 0.1560
     - Leather -0.1584 0.1441 1.21 0.2717
     - Metal -0.0949 0.1141 0.69 0.4057
     - Stone -0.0928 0.1410 0.43 0.5102
     - Textile -0.0332 0.1463 0.05 0.8206
Cross-functional integration structure for the 
incremental NPD process
-0.2624 0.1077 5.94 0.0148
Log (Company size) -0.0000 0.0001 0.06 0.8042
Professionalization NPD Strategy -0.1205 0.0360 11.19 0.0008
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Impact of integration structure on breakthrough innovation performance 
Table VII summarizes the findings of the Tobit analysis whereby breakthrough innovation 
performance acts as the dependent variable. 
 
 
 
In line with hypothesis 3, we observe that companies that rely on a cross-functional integration 
structure to organize their radical NPD process outperform companies that do not apply a cross-
functional approach for structuring radical NPD in terms of breakthrough innovation 
performance. We also observe a significant positive relationship between professionalization of 
NPD and breakthrough innovation performance. Again, we did not observe significant industry 
or size effects on breakthrough innovation performance. 
 
  
Table VII: Results of Tobit analysis – dependent variable: Breakthrough innovation 
performance (N = 155; Pseudo R2= 0.17)
Variable Estimate St Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 1.6120 0.3863 17.41 <.0001
Industry: (Reference category: Automotive)
     - Other -0.8460 0.4601 3.38 0.0660
     - Chemical 0.1271 0.2983 0.18 0.6700
     - Electronics 0.4101 0.3688 1.24 0.2663
     - Instruments 0.4858 0.3030 2.57 0.1088
     - Leather 0.3882 0.2783 1.95 0.1630
     - Metal 0.0902 0.2212 0.17 0.6833
     - Stone 0.0898 0.2714 0.11 0.7406
     - Textile -0.0259 0.2741 0.01 0.9247
Cross-functional integration structure for 
radical NPD Process
0.5245 0.1562 11.28 0.0008
Log (Company size) -0.0003 0.0003 1.04 0.3079
Professionalization NPD Strategy 0.2196 0.0703 9.77 0.0018
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this section, we first present the main implications of our findings. In particular, we rely on 
our findings to discuss the relevance of structural ambidexterity in NPD processes. In addition, 
we discuss the impact of professionalization of NPD strategy on different kinds of innovation 
performance. Subsequently, we point to the main limitations of our study and suggest interesting 
avenues for future research. 
 
Relevance of structural ambidexterity in NPD processes 
Relying on organizational learning theory (e.g. March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993), 
several scholars (e.g. Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 
2008;;  Tushman  and  O’Reilly,  1996; Van Looy et al., 2005) have argued that, if a company wants 
to excel in both improving existing products (i.e. derivative innovation performance) and 
generating new products (i.e. breakthrough innovation performance), it should apply structural 
ambidexterity, meaning that organizations explicitly separate incremental and radical NPD 
processes and organize them in a different way (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). Such structural 
ambidexterity ensures that each NPD process is configured according to its specific task 
requirements (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). Although the structural ambidexterity argument 
has become increasingly popular in the academic literature, our data seem to suggest that the 
popularity of this strategy among practitioners is rather low. Making an explicit distinction 
between the incremental and radical NPD process in our survey, we were able to examine 
whether firms tend to apply a different integration structure for different kinds of NPD processes. 
However, our data show that the majority of our firms preferred a standardized approach 
concerning their integration structure. In particular, 67.1 % of the respondents indicated that they 
used a cross-functional integration structure for both their incremental and radical NPD 
processes. 
 
At the same time, though, our analyses of the impact of different integration structures (i.e. 
functional versus cross-functional) in different kinds of NPD processes (i.e. incremental versus 
radical) on different kinds of innovation performance (i.e. derivative versus breakthrough) 
indicate that organizations might indeed benefit from adopting structural ambidexterity. In line 
with previous research that focused on the relationship between integration structures and 
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performance on the project level (i.e. Olson et al., 1995; Song and Xie, 2000; Olson et al., 2001), 
we found evidence that the effectiveness of integration is different among different kinds of NPD 
processes. In particular, we observed that, while adopting a cross-functional integration structure 
- instead of a functional integration structure - in radical NPD processes has a significant positive 
impact on breakthrough innovation performance, the implementation of a cross-functional 
integration structure in incremental NPD processes has a significant negative impact on 
incremental innovation performance. Based on these findings, we argue that firms that manage to 
apply a cross-functional integration structure for their radical NPD processes and a functional 
integration structure for their incremental NPD processes will be the most successful in terms of 
balancing derivative and breakthrough innovation performance. 
 
Professionalization of NPD and its impact on innovation performance. 
The implementation of a professional NPD strategy, characterized by strategically aligned NPD 
activities and by a systematic portfolio management system, has been identified as an important 
driver of innovation performance (Cooper, 1996, 1999, 2001; Cooper et al., 2004; Griffin, 1997). 
While these studies approached innovation performance in quite general terms, we have made an 
explicit distinction between derivative and breakthrough innovation performance. In this way, 
we  were  able  to  show  that  changes  in  the  professionalization  of  a  firm’s  NPD  strategy  trigger  a  
trade-off between breakthrough and derivative innovation performance. In particular, our 
findings indicate that investing in the professionalization of the NPD strategy enhances the 
breakthrough innovation performance of firms, but, at the same time, reduces their derivative 
innovation performance. These findings suggest that professionalization of the NPD strategy 
does not influence the innovation performance in absolute terms, but rather changes the balance 
between different kinds of innovation performance (i.e. derivative versus breakthrough 
innovation performance). 
 
Limitations and future research 
A first limitation of this study is that we focused on one particular country (i.e. US). However, 
previous project-level research (i.e. Song and Xie, 2000) already indicated that the relationship 
between integration structures, product innovativeness and project performance is influenced by 
the national culture in which the firm is embedded. In a similar vein, it can be expected that 
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national differences might influence the effectiveness of integration structures on firm-level 
innovation performance. We therefore encourage researchers to conduct an international 
comparison of the impact of integration structures in different kinds of NPD processes on 
different kinds of innovation performance. 
 
In this study, we made a distinction between functional and cross-functional integration 
structures. However, previous research on individual NPD projects (e.g. Olson et al., 2001; Song 
et al., 1998; Souder, 1988) indicates that firms can implement different kinds of cross-functional 
integration structures. In particular, they have made a distinction between 1) cross-functional 
team structures in which both R&D, manufacturing, and marketing people are present and 2) 
cross-functional team structures in which only two departments are represented.  
 
Moreover, these studies provide first indications that the particular composition of cross-
functional integration teams might influence project performance. We therefore point to the need 
for future firm-level research on the relationship between integration structures and innovation 
performance in which more fine-grained measures for the applied integration structure are used. 
 
It also needs to be stressed that we only examined the difference between incremental and radical 
development processes in terms of their applied integration structure. However, incremental and 
radical development processes can also differ on other dimensions. For instance, it might be 
interesting to assess whether critical roles such as idea generators, project champions and 
gatekeepers (Roberts and Fusfeld, 1982) are present in incremental and radical development 
processes and how the presence of these roles in different kinds of NPD processes influences 
different kinds of innovation outcomes. 
 
Although we were able to examine which kind of integration structure firms applied for their 
incremental and radical NPD processes, we do not know why firms chose a particular integration 
structure. This latter question seems to be very relevant as we observed that firms tend to prefer a 
standardized approach (i.e. cross-functional integration structure for both incremental and radical 
NPD processes) despite the fact that we found clear indications of the benefits of adopting a 
more diversified approach (i.e. functional structure for the incremental NPD process and cross-
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functional structure for the radical NPD process). We therefore emphasize the need for future 
case study research that provides fine-grained insights in why companies make particular 
integration structure choices for their NPD activities. 
 
Despite these limitations, this paper has contributed to a firm-level perspective on the 
management of NPD processes, acknowledging the relevance of structural ambidexterity in 
organizing NPD. We hope that NPD managers will consider our practical suggestions and that 
our results may motivate researchers to continue exploring the NPD process in a wide variety of 
organizational settings. 
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5 
GONE WITH THE WIND?  
A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF EXPLORATIVE INNOVATION 
IN A GROWING WIND TURBINE BLADE TECHNOLOGY COMPANY3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars have stressed the need for balancing exploitation with sufficient levels of 
exploration (e.g. Ancona et al., 2001; Benner and Tushman, 2002; Dougherty, 1992; Levinthal 
and March, 1993; March, 1991, 2006). Organizations that have a one-sided focus on exploitation 
by allocating resources to refinement of existing technologies rather than to developing new 
skills and capabilities, achieve immediate success at the future risk of becoming obsolete 
(Holmqvist, 2004; Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
 
For growing companies, maintaining sufficient levels of exploration is challenging. Investing in 
exploration competes with investing in exploitation, of which the outcomes are more secure and 
less remote in time (March, 1991). When organizations grow, they tend to skew to efficiency and 
develop core capabilities for exploitation of current success (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). These 
establishing mindsets, expertise and routines are different from those required for exploration 
(Gupta et al., 2006). The more they become embedded, the more challenging it becomes to 
transition the organization toward revival of exploration.  
 
Previous studies have emphasized the complexity of balancing exploration and exploitation 
levels (e.g. Sorensen, 2002; Voss et al., 2008; Benner, 2007) and have provided insights into 
structural and individual factors that influence them (e.g. Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Burns and 
Stalker,   1961;;   Benner   and   Tushman,   2003;;   Tushman   and   O’Reilly,   1996;;   Scott   and   Bruce,  
1994). Whereas the individualist perspective seeks to explain innovative behavior in terms of 
                                                          
3 This chapter is based on a previous paper: 
 
De Visser, M.,  Faems, D., Visscher, K., De Weerd-Nederhof, P.C., 2010. Toward a dynamic perspective on 
explorative and exploitative innovation activities: a longitudinal study in the wind blade industry. In proceedings of 
the International Product Development Management Conference, Murcia, Spain, June 13-15. 
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characteristics and actions of organizational participants, the structural perspective assumes that 
innovation is most strongly influenced by organizational characteristics such as formalization, 
slack resources and organizational structure.  
 
Although these studies have provided valuable insights into the factors that influence exploration 
in organizations, only few have unraveled the process of how these structural and individual 
factors affect changing exploration levels in growing organizations. Since the time dimension is 
mostly absent in existing studies (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005) and only 
partial relationships are illuminated (Eisenhardt, 2010), it remains unclear how structural and 
individual antecedents in growing organizations interrelate and how they affect exploration 
decline and recovery.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide in-depth insights into the dynamics of a growing 
organization’s   exploration   levels   and   to   explain   how   structural   and   individual   factors   impact  
these over time. In order to do so, we conduct a single case study in a fast growing R&D 
organization in the wind turbine blade industry. Based on a unique collection of time-accounting 
data and descriptions of all R&D activities performed within a timeframe of 100 months, we are 
able to measure the dynamics of exploration levels, visualizing in great detail how a firm goes 
through transitions from focus on exploration to exploitation and vice versa. Based on a series of 
interviews with employees of this organization, we demonstrate how structural and individual 
factors interact and impact this evolution.  
 
Together our findings provide new insights into multi-level interactions among antecedents of 
exploration, in particular the interactions between slack resources, formalization, tenure and 
cognitive style. For practitioners, the method we present could serve as a tool to detect 
exploration trends and evaluate the effectiveness of innovation policy. Our findings also help 
managers to understand and tackle the challenges involved in the transformation process of 
growing R&D organizations from decline to recovery of exploration. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Young organizations have a higher tendency to die than old organizations (Stinchcombe, 1965) 
because of a limited customer base, a lack of specific resources, and the need to learn new roles. 
In order to develop these, young organizations invest in exploration (Lavie et al., 2010). Once 
they have become successful, however, they run the risk to over-invest in the exploitation of 
their early gained success. In maturing and growing organizations, exploitation tends to drive out 
exploration (Levinthal and March, 1993). This can be explained by the iteratively self-enforcing 
nature of exploitative activities.  
 
Exploitation often leads to early success, which in turn reinforces further exploitation along the 
same trajectory. The more immediate returns from exploitation tend to cause organizations to 
exhibit a myopic bias whereby exploitation is overemphasized at the expense of exploration 
(Levinthal and March, 1993). Within an organizational unit, exploration and exploitation are 
mutually exclusive and compete for scarce organizational resources. More resources devoted to 
exploitation imply fewer resources left over for exploration and vice versa (Gupta et al., 2006). 
Organizations thus have to decide between short-term productivity and long-term innovation. 
Compared to returns from exploitation, returns from exploration are less certain, more remote in 
time, and more distant from the locus of action (March, 1991). Investing in explorative activities 
therefore involves higher risk investments which challenges organizations to decide whether 
certain, immediate success should be hedged for potential future success. Many organizations 
tend to be become risk-averse in making these investment decisions. 
 
Furthermore, maturing organizations become more efficient as they leverage accumulated 
experience and established ties to vendors and customers (Penrose, 1959). Stakeholders may 
favor organizations that demonstrate rational action, accountability, and reliable performance 
(Benner, 2007; Hannan and Freeman, 1984), encouraging further commitment of existing 
routines, structures, and competencies. These pressures reinforce the tendency to exploit existing 
capabilities and leverage past experience (Lavie et al., 2010). Also, individuals tend to pursue 
solutions similar to already-known solutions because bounded rationality limits their ability to 
search all possible domains of knowledge (Simon, 1979) and biases them toward more salient 
areas of their own prior experiences (Cyert and March, 1963). Over time, these structures and 
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individual behaviors become deeply embedded in the organization (McNamara and Baden-
Fuller,   1999).   Once   changes   in   an   organization’s   environment   ask   for   recovery   of   activities,  
switching costs may have become high (Kogut and Zander, 1992) because the structures and 
individuals that have been developed for efficient exploitation, are substantially different from 
those required for exploration (Gupta et al., 2006). In the past decades, scholars have described 
various structural and individual antecedents of exploration. For innovation in growing 
organizations, particularly slack resources, organizational structures, tenure and cognitive styles 
are relevant factors (Faems et al., 2011; Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Lavie et al., 2010). These will be 
discussed below. 
 
Slack resources 
As companies grow, they often attain access to resources that are in excess of the minimum 
necessary to produce a certain level of output (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). These slack resources 
facilitate search, experimentation, and innovation while avoiding some harmful consequences in 
case of failure (Levinthal and March, 1993; Damanpour, 1992). Besides, they allow employees 
to take their mind of day-to-day survival and to consider long-term development of the firm 
(Nohria and Gulati, 1996). Increasing availability of slack resources might thus positively 
influence  the  level  of  an  organization’s  exploration  activities.  However,  the  relationship  between  
the slack resources and exploration may be not that straightforward as it seems to be contingent 
on several factors. 
 
In the face of a major environmental threat, the availability of slack steers an organization toward 
exploration (Voss et al., 2008). Especially when the survival of the firm depends on the ability to 
come up with new engines of growth (Lavie et al., 2010), slack is likely to be deployed for new 
purposes (Bourgeois, 1981).  When competitive intensity is mitigated, organizations are more 
likely to consume slack resources by sustaining current operations (Voss et al., 2008). 
 
The relationship between the availability of slack and exploration might also be dependent on the 
degree to which it is absorbed. For instance, opposed to financial resources, human resources are 
absorbed  when   they  are   tied  up   in   the  organization’s  current  operations.  Human  resources   that  
are acquired and developed to build existing routines likely possess skills that are most 
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applicable to incumbent product domains. As a result, they might be less readily reallocated to 
exploration than slack financial resources (Voss et al., 2008).  
 
Organizational structure 
Organizations execute their operations via structures that define the distribution of power, 
resources, and responsibilities across different functions and units. Whereas mechanistic 
structures support routine operations, functional specialization, standardization, formalization 
and hierarchy, organic modes of organizing rely on less rigid establishments, allow for more 
freedom and support flexibility (Burns and Wholey, 1993; Burns and Stalker, 1961). Duncan 
(1976) suggests that organizations require organic modes for the initiation of innovations, and 
mechanistic structures to implement and deploy them.  
 
As organizations grow, they tend to become more structured (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). This 
can be explained by the contingency theory of innovation developed by Zaltman et al. (1973). 
According to this theory, the gathering and processing of information, which is crucial at the 
initiation stage, is facilitated by high complexity, low formalization, and low centralization. 
During the implementation phase, however, higher levels of formalization and centralization, 
combined with low complexity are likely to facilitate innovation because role conflict and 
ambiguity are reduced. Consequently, Zaltman et al. (1973) argue that an organization must be 
able to shift its structure as it moves through the various stages of innovation. An organic 
structure seems to be required for the initiation of innovations, whereas implementation may be 
best supported by a mechanistic structure (Zaltman et al., 1973; Greiner, 1972). 
 
Several authors argue that mechanistic and organic structures are difficult to reconcile within a 
single firm because of their opposed natures (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Lewis, 2000). For 
organizations that have implemented rigid mechanistic structures for the exploitation of 
innovation, it might therefore be challenging to un-structure and regain more organic modes of 
organizing for the initiation of a new stream of innovations. Recent studies, however, have 
provided views on how to resolve the tension between both activities by combining mechanistic 
and organic features in separated or parallel structures (Adler et al., 1999; Jansen et al., 2005; 
Sheremata, 2000). 
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The first view that examines how the tension between exploration and exploitation can be 
resolved emphasizes structural ambidexterity. The conflicting demands between exploration and 
exploration can be addressed by using spatial differentiation, such as creating organizational 
spinouts to pursue new opportunities (Christensen and Bower, 1996; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 
2001; Gilbert, 2005). Small, decentralized organization units focused on flexible exploration are 
physically separated from large centralized organizational units focused on efficient exploitation 
(Benner and Tushman, 2003). These spatially separated units remain isolated, securing the 
independence of their activities, culture, and cognitive framing (Gilbert, 2006). 
 
In contrast to the spatial separation concept, several studies described an alternative path to 
combining exploration and exploitation by managing them separately within the same 
organizational unit. The use of parallel structures allows people to switch back and forth between 
two or more types of structures, depending on the structure that their specific task requires 
(Bushe and Shani, 1991; McDonough and Leifer, 1983; Stein and Kanter, 1980; Zand, 1974). An 
organizational   unit’s   main   structure   serves   exploitative activities and can be used for routine 
tasks and for maintenance of stability and efficiency. Additional structures, such as cross-
functional  team  structures,  balance  the  primary  structure’s  shortcomings  and  support  non-routine 
tasks and innovation (Goldstein, 1985). The supplementary structure coexists with the primary 
task structure to ensure efficiency and flexibility (Adler et al., 1999). Contrary to the spatial 
separation concept, parallel structures therefore allow competing demands for exploitation and 
exploration to be addressed within a single business unit (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). 
 
Cognitive style 
Beside structural organizational factors that prescribe and guide human behavior, also individual 
characteristics have an impact on exploration. In the analysis of organizational behavior, 
individual differences in information processing tendencies have been widely adopted. These 
encompass a range of cognitively based variables, reflecting in general terms the distinction 
between analytic and intuitive processing (Chaiken and Trope, 1999). 
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In R&D task environments, both types of information processing are significantly related to 
exploration and exploitation (Scott and Bruce, 1992). Individuals that have a tendency toward 
analytic processing tend to be more compliant, favor a structured approach to problem solving, 
depend on systematic methods of investigation, recall verbal material most readily and are 
especially comfortable with ideas requiring step by step analysis (Allinson and Hayes, 1996).  
 
Individuals having a tendency toward intuitive information processing tend to make judgments 
based on feeling and the adoption of a global perspective. Intuitivists are relatively 
nonconformist, prefer an open-ended approach to problem solving, rely on random methods of 
exploration, remember spatial images most easily, and work best with ideas requiring overall 
assessment (Allinson and Hayes, 1996).  
 
Neither style is considered preferable per se; it is the fit between problem-solving style and a task 
and work environment that determines individual task performance (Payne et al., 1990). Whereas 
intuitive thinkers perform better in unstructured, organic organizational modes by which young 
organizations are often characterized, analytic thinkers favor structured, mechanistic 
organizational modes (Armstrong and Priola, 2001). In aging and growing organizations that 
skew toward efficiency and increase formalization, work environments might therefore become 
less motivating for individuals that tend to prefer an intuitive thinking style (Greiner, 1972).  
 
Tenure 
Length of tenure is negatively associated with explorative behavior of individuals in R&D 
environments (e.g. Pierce and Delbecq, 1977; Scott and Bruce, 1994), which implies that 
individuals become less explorative as they age and enter later stages of their career. In addition, 
the cognitive templates that are developed among employees that collaborate for long periods of 
time have a negative impact on exploration. According to the Not Invented Here syndrome, 
groups can become increasingly cohesive over time and begin to separate themselves from 
external sources of technical information and influence by communicating less frequently with 
professional colleagues outside their teams (Katz, 1982). Rather than striving to enlarge the 
scope of their information processing activities, long-tenured groups become increasingly 
complacent about outside events and new technological developments. The extent to which they 
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may be willing or even feel the need to expose themselves to new or alternative ideas and ways 
of problem solving, lessens with time (Katz, 1982). Similarly, as senior-management teams 
mature, they get more internally focused and more homogeneous. This homogenizing process is 
accentuated in high-performing organizations and, in turn, facilitates exploitation while driving 
out  exploration  (Hambrick  et  al.,  2005;;  O’Reilly  and  Tushman,  2008). 
 
Although these studies have provided valuable insights in the factors that influence exploration, 
they do not reveal the complexity of this process and illuminate only part of the story (Eisenhardt 
et al., 2010). It remains unclear how structural and individual antecedents of exploration interact 
and in which way they influence exploration levels in growing organizations. In particular, the 
process of how growing organizations manage to recover explorative activity after a phase of 
intense exploitation has been underinvestigated (Faems et al, 2011). Also more in general, 
scholars (e.g. Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Groysberg and Lee, 2009; Raisch et al., 2009) 
have stressed the need to develop a longitudinal perspective on the evolution of exploration in 
order to provide a better understanding of this process. With this paper we address this need by 
providing in-depth  insights  into  the  dynamics  of  a  growing  organization’s  exploration  levels  and  
by explaining how the structural and individual factors influence this process. In order to 
investigate this process, an accurate method for longitudinal measurement of exploration 
intensity is required. As objective, replicable methods for exploration measurement are absent in 
the literature, we developed a new method, which will be introduced in the next section.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Our study was conducted in a wind turbine blade technology company, which was founded in 
1999 and acquired by an Asian wind power company in 2001. As can be seen from figure 1, it 
faced a steady growth of employees since the year of 2003. We were informed in 2009 that this 
particular company had experienced a decline of innovation and that it had attempted to recover 
fundamental research activities, which made it the optimal setting to study exploration dynamics 
in a growing company. Our study consisted of two stages. In the first stage we reconstructed the 
evolution of exploration and exploitation dynamics in the company in the past 100 months. In the 
second stage, we investigated the drivers of these dynamics. 
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Figure 1: full time equivalents (FTE) between 2003 and 2011 
 
 
Reconstruction of exploration dynamics 
A longitudinal perspective on exploration and exploitation levels requires a methodological shift 
in research on exploration and exploitation (Raisch et al., 2009). Due to the limited reliability of 
informants’   retrospective   accounts   (e.g.   Golden,   1992),   surveys   are   less   appropriate   for  
measurement of exploration levels over time. In order to draw causal relationships between 
structural and individual factors and the impact they have on exploration dynamics, we need a 
more accurate understanding of exploration levels related to specific points in time. We therefore 
develop a new method by deploying archival data on all R&D activities performed in the firm. 
We  gained  access  to  the  company’s  network  drive  containing  descriptions  of  all  391  research  and  
development projects that were realized in a period of 100 months in the years 2003 to 2011. 
These descriptions were obtained from various standardized documents that were used for 
project budget requests: activity release notes (ARN), budget release notes (BRN), project 
request forms (PRF), release note budget (RNB), release note project (RNP) and release note 
small project (RNSP). Projects that were not focused on development of technology and products 
(e.g. help desk related activities or activities related to organizational development) were 
removed from the database, resulting in a total amount of 384 project descriptions. The following 
example illustrates the way projects were described: 
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XX403 blade went into serial production before the blade was structurally tested and certified. 
The structural test revealed two weak blade details that need to be updated, both in new 
production and in existing blades. This project addresses the update of existing blades and 
provides a feasible solution for this. Currently no blade failures on existing blades (containing 
the weak details) have been reported. Further no turbines having these blades have been 
preventively stopped. Hence consequential costs are minimal. This project aims in keeping any 
damage costs on existing blades to a minimum, by developing an economic upgrade solution to 
be executed before any failures on existing blades can occur (with consequential damage costs). 
Objectives of this project are: define feasible solution for structural upgrade of existing XX403 
blades; verify solution on critical aspects (such as safety, quality, economics, ergonomics, etc.); 
achieve commitment from STS for upgrade execution; execute trials to confirm upgrade 
solution; handover upgrade solution to STS.  
 
In order to measure the amount of resources the focal company allocated to exploitative and 
explorative activities over time, we first labeled projects in which explorative activities were 
dominant as explorative, and projects in which exploitative activities were dominant as 
exploitative. This was done in a manner similar to the method applied by Uotila et al. (2009), 
which is based on word-counts of key words. As proposed by Lavie et al. (2010) we related back 
to   March’s   (1991)   original   definitions   of   exploration   and   exploitation.   Perceiving   them   as  
opposing activities along a continuum, we used a single variable for capturing exploration–
exploitation (e.g. Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Lin et al., 2007; Uotila et al., 2009). 
 
The classification of the projects into explorative and exploitative activities was based on the 
definition  provided  by  March  (1991):  “Explorative  activities  can  be  characterized  by  terms  such  
as search, variation, risk-taking, experimentation, play, flexibility and discovery. Exploitative 
activities can be characterized by aspects such as refinement, choice, production, efficiency, 
selection,  implementation  and  execution.”  We  searched  for  synonyms  of the nouns and verbs in 
the  thesaurus  that  is  part  of  the  current  version  of  Apple’s  operating  system,  which  resulted  into  
75 keywords for exploration and 75 keywords for exploitation. We then stemmed all of these 
words and calculated their frequencies in the project descriptions.  We labeled each project either 
“explorative”  or  “exploitative”  based  on  the  category  with  the  highest  count  of  the  key  words.  In  
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the examples above, the underlined words are associated with exploration and the words in bold 
are associated with exploitation. As the amount of word counts in the description of the project 
in the example is higher in the exploitation category (23) compared to the exploration category 
(4), this project is labeled exploitative.  
 
Together, the collection of project descriptions contained 4243 counts of our key words of which 
2271 in the exploration category and 1972 in the exploitation category. Based on our method, of 
all 389 projects that were performed in the time frame of 100 months, 200 were labeled 
explorative and 189 were labeled exploitative. 
 
In  order  to  measure  the  change  of  exploration  levels  over  time,  we  made  use  of  the  company’s  
time-accounting system in which all project members had entered the amount of time spent on 
each project they were involved in.  Combining these data with the categorized projects, we 
could calculate how the total amount of project time had been divided over explorative and 
exploitative projects in the past 100 months. On the project described before, for instance, 283 
hours were spent. The total amount of project time that was spent in this time frame consisted of 
209547 explorative and 513838 exploitative working hours. 
 
In order to validate our reconstruction of the way the focal company divided attention over 
exploration and exploitation, we asked the R&D director and the head Product Market 
Technology (PMT) to label the 50 projects the organization spent most working hours on as 
explorative or exploitative, and compared their classification with our results. We chose to have 
the largest projects checked, because these would have the biggest impact on our reconstruction 
of exploration and exploitation dynamics and would probably be best remembered by our 
informants.  In 82% of the cases the classification based on our measurements was identical to 
the classification made by the R&D director and head of PMT, which indicates that project 
classification based on our word counting method is quite accurate. In addition, we presented our 
reconstruction of exploration levels to two senior engineers, one junior engineer and one of the 
co-founders of the company and asked them to judge our measurements. All four informants 
unanimously  agreed  on  the  organization’s  tendencies  toward  exploration  over  time  based  on  our  
calculations.   
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Antecedents of exploration dynamics 
In the second stage we conducted retrospective semi-structured interviews in order to investigate 
how structural and individual factors influenced the changes of exploration levels we measured. 
Each interview was conducted individually, face-to-face, and in the native language of the 
interviewee to maximize his or her ability to express thoughts, feelings, and opinions. During 
these interviews, we introduced the concepts of exploration and exploitation and asked about the 
informants’   perception   of   how   the   amount   of   time   invested   in   both   types   of   activities   had  
evolved in the selected timeframe of 100 months, and about their explanations for the changes in 
the exploration levels they described.   
 
Retrospective data collection allowed for a focused process because it reduced the danger of data 
overload and collecting much unusable data (Poole et al., 2000). However, documenting cases in 
a retrospective way also has its disadvantages (Golden, 1997). For instance, respondents have the 
tendency to filter out events that do not fit or that render their story less coherent (Poole et al., 
2000). To improve the validity and reliability of these retrospective reports and prevent accepting 
respondent bias, we applied a number of strategies.  
 
First, we attempted to verify individual reports by asking similar questions to multiple 
informants. We interviewed eight employees with various backgrounds: the R&D director 
(DRD), the Product Market Technology manager (PMT), one of the co-founders of the company 
who had worked in the company until 2007 (COF), two senior engineers (ENS), one junior 
engineer (ENJ), one project manager (PM) and the manufacturing technology manager (MT). 
These interviewees were selected at multiple levels in the organization in order to be able to 
study relations between antecedents of exploration and exploitation on both strategic and 
operational levels.  
 
Second, interview data were coded into three categories (structural, individual and 
environmental) and compared with minutes of meetings, management reports, archival project 
data and newspapers to triangulate and supplement the information obtained during the 
interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). 
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Third, we asked informants to reflect on concrete events (e.g. development of specific product 
types) rather than abstract concepts to reduce the risk of cognitive biases and impression 
management. 
 
Finally, as we examine changes in structural and individual variables in relation to the passage of 
time,  the  time  factor  must  be  accounted  for   in  our  study’s  design  (Street  and  Ward,  2012).  We  
therefore paid considerable attention to the chronological sequence of events by linking 
statements of our informants to the 100-month timeline and exploration graph in the second part 
of the interviews. 
 
The interviews proved to be an excellent source of data and, despite their small number, showed 
a surprising degree of agreement and comprehensiveness. We have no indication that further 
interviews among seniors or juniors would reveal any significant new insights. 
 
RESULTS 
Figure 2 displays the levels of explorative innovation activities as a percentage of total working 
hours spent on innovation projects within a timeframe of 100 months. It shows fluctuations of 
exploration levels from month to month, which can be explained by heavy fluctuations of time 
spent within explorative and exploitative projects. At the same time, a clear trend can be 
observed. Initial high levels of explorative activities decline from month 20 onwards to a level 
that is about half the initial level. Around month 50, a significant but short revival of exploration 
is visible. Only in the last 20-30 months, a steady growth of exploration can be observed. In the 
remainder of this section, we will explain what influenced this evolution of innovation activities 
over the years. 
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Figure 2: evolution of explorative innovation activities in a period of 100 months 
 
 
In the mid-nineties, wind energy was in its very early stage of development. At that time, when 
most wind blade manufacturers relied on hand laminating techniques, a Dutch company explored 
the manufacturing of epoxy wind blades using vacuum injection techniques. These vacuum 
injection techniques turned out to be a success and were adapted by new players in the wind 
energy market. The company grew steadily, but suffered from financial problems and went 
bankrupt. It then was taken over by a large energy company. In 2001, the key engineers of the 
initial blade company left and teamed up again as a full daughter company of an Asian wind 
energy company.  
 
At the beginning of the 100-month timeframe we investigated, working hours were almost 
equally divided between exploration and exploitation. Engineers were given the task by the 
mother company to implement technologies for a 1 Megawatt wind turbine that had been 
developed before: 
 
“The  implementation  of  666 technology was a matter of off-the-shelf engineering. We 
developed  it  ourselves,  so  it  was  relatively  easy  to  effectuate  it.”  (COF) 
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As the implementation went smooth, engineers had time left to explore new technologic 
trajectories for the development of a completely new blade model. It was decided to not build 
any further on existing blade models. Much effort was put into developing new technologies 
and  designing  a  blade   that   could   “compete  on  a  global   scale”   and   serve   a  higher   capacity,  
1.25 Megawatt turbine. All engineers at that time were eager to innovate in their field of 
expertise and worked long days to make the new blade model a success. One engineer, who 
joined the company later during this period, illustrated the entrepreneurial character of his 
colleagues: 
 
“You  could  call   them  self-propelling technology owners. Most of them started their 
own  firm  afterwards”.  (ENS) 
 
During this period the total amount of employees was no more than 25. Employees had no 
job titles and task descriptions and there were hardly any formalized procedures. There was 
little focus on control of speed, budget and quality and there was hardly any management. 
Only slight attention was paid to write down detailed manuals for production. As a 
consequence, workers at the production facilities in Asia had to work with very concise 
instructions.  That  wasn’t  problematic  at   that   time  as  the  blades  were  small  and  allowed  for  
relatively high tolerances without causing any trouble when in use. 
 
Exploration decline 
The mother company, which was one of the later entrants in the global wind energy market, 
competed aggressively with low-cost wind turbines and soon sales increased dramatically (see 
figure 3). In order to compete with the largest wind energy companies, cheaper and bigger wind 
blades  had  to  be  developed  quickly.  The  new  “31/32”  blade  design  became  the  basis  for  a  range  
of  models  that  followed,  named  “V2”  extensions.  The  dimensions  of  the  initial  new  blade  design  
were pushed to its limits in a fast pace to make it fit with higher capacity 1.5 and 2.0 MegaWatt 
turbines. The following statements are illustrative in this respect: 
 
“We  just  boosted  the  dimensions  of  the  design  to  fit  with  a  set  of  blades  for  1.5  and  
2.0  turbines”  (COF) 
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 “I   think   [the   company’s]   credo   was:   let’s   go   for   it,   full   throttle,   we   know   we’ll  
sometimes  lose  control  and  fail,  but  we’ll  mend  and  manage.”  (SEN) 
 
Figure 3: sales of the mother company 
 
 
Although more personnel was attracted to support the fast development of new blade designs, 
one interviewee mentioned that there was not sufficient time available to test new versions of 
blades thoroughly: 
 
“Sometimes  prototypes  went  straight  into  production”  (COF) 
 
The fast-pace adjustments to existing blade designs were made without sufficient tests before 
they went into production. The wind blades seemed to suffer severely from their increase in size 
and  soon  serious  problems  including  “blade  cracks”  were  reported  in  the  field.  Some  blades  even  
broke off the turbines while they were in operation. Due to these technological issues and the 
huge increase in sales, the number of root cause analyses and problem solving support requests 
snowballed and the blade company became occupied with fixing problems.  Most engineers were 
busy handling requests from the help & support desk, leaving little time available for 
fundamental research and product innovation. 
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Some engineers that formed the original team became unhappy with the situation in this phase. 
The mother company stimulated transfer of wind blade expertise to the production facilities in 
Asia, but the key engineers from the early days were reluctant to release their professional 
knowledge and experience. Before the huge increase in sales, they thought they were promised to 
receive sales-dependent royalties for their efforts on the original blade design. However, when 
that design became successful, they never received the royalties they were promised before. As a 
result, some of the key engineers that were the driving force behind new blade designs left, 
leaving the company behind with limited documentation about the technologies applied in the 
blade designs. 
 
“We  did  not  document  the  technologies  in  enough  detail  so  that  we  could  just  throw  it  
over the wall to the production facilities in Asia. In the documentation we had, hardly 
any  tolerances  were  mentioned.”  (COF) 
 
The lack of an effective documentation system for blade designs, made problem solving even 
more time consuming because production workers in Asia were hardly trained. In particular new 
workers in the production facilities had great difficulty interpreting the manuals and translating 
them into the desired specifications of the blades. On a regular basis, a team from the blade 
company visited the production facilities to train the employees: 
 
 “We  acted  like  an  educational  institute  for  Asia.”  (SEN) 
 
However, once employees in production had improved their skills, they left and went to other 
Asian manufacturers because they paid better salaries. So training activities never stopped: 
 
“We  had  the  feeling  we  could  start  all  over  from  scratch,  again  and  again.”  (SEN) 
 
In order to deal with the load of problem solving requests and improvement of the 
documentation system, more employees were hired. Along with the complexity of activities, the 
organizational structure became more complex. The flat organizational chart from the beginning 
evolved into a structure with separated departments for each technical core competence and 
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additional layers of management. Also, a project management department was created. In order 
to increase control over adherence to speed, quality and budget, standard processes were 
introduced for every project, led by one or more project managers. Some of the respondents were 
rather skeptical about this approach: 
 
“Have  you  seen  our  project-list?  It’s  ridiculous!  And  now  they  also  want  to  pour  some   
stage-gating on top of that. That will never work. (PMT) 
 
Many respondents complained about the walls that were created between the disciplines. Not 
only in terms of coordination an supervision, but also physically. All functional areas became 
separated in dedicated rooms, spread over two floors. The following statement illustrated how 
the entrepreneurial firm of the beginning had turned into a bureaucracy: 
 
“People   who   visit   us   all   react   the   same: the club is numb, everyone sits behind their 
desks.  Where’s  the  spirit,  the  real  debate;;  what  is  really  going  on  here?  Everyone  is  just  
writing  procedures.”    (MT) 
 
Although the new procedures were considered necessary to take control over the workload of 
problem solving requests, some employees were convinced that research and development 
became over formalized. 
 
“It’s  not  a  high  tech  product.  It  consists  of  just  a  few  components  that  happen  to  be  big.  
That’s  it.”  (MT) 
 
“They   installed   a   whole   army   of   administrators, but I am convinced that with just a 
bunch  of  specialists,  you  could  do  better  than  them”  (COF) 
 
Again, some of the founders and senior engineers left the company. According to the 
interviewees, these entrepreneurial and highly creative engineers   couldn’t   adjust   to   the   high  
degree of formalization and the way they had to account for every new initiative. In order to deal 
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with the growing amount of support activities and the leave of experienced personnel, new 
employees were attracted to become problem-solving specialists.  
 
In Europe, people with experience in the field of wind blade technology were scarce and the new 
engineers who joined the company came straight from university. New employees that had more 
experience mainly came from other industries, such as ship building and aviation. This implied 
that a lot of time had to be invested to train them for the job, which again could not be invested 
in exploration. It also became clear that it was very difficult to train new people for problem-
solving activities, as the knowledge about the step-by-step history of products iterations was hard 
to transfer. This history was hardly documented and mainly tacit knowledge of the experienced 
people who left. Figure 4, which illustrates the development of company experience within the 
100-month timeframe, shows some big drops in mean tenure as a result of the leave of 
experienced personnel and the hiring of new employees. 
 
Figure 4: mean tenure 
 
In order to attract more blade technology expertise, a separate research unit was created in 
another European country to tap into a local highly developed knowledge infrastructure in which 
skilled engineers were more readily available. Its mission was to work on technology 
development that could not be done in The Netherlands as most of the new employees were more 
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oriented toward exploitative activities. Also, a joint venture with another blade company was 
initiated to increase fundamental research on new blade technologies. Knowledge transfer 
between these new initiatives and our focal company, however, was very limited. All of our 
respondents experienced the actions of the mother company to build multiple centers of blade 
technology  knowledge  as  “divide  et impera”  tactics;;  all  of  the  units  aspiring  to  be  in  the  lead  of  
new  technologies  not  trusting  each  other  because  the  mother  company  perceives  them  as  “many  
horses  in  the  race”,  not  treating  them  as  a  whole  system  to  build  up  to  future  blade  development. 
 
When exploitative activities had become dominant, engineers realized that new technologies had 
to be developed to stay competitive. They also felt stimulated to boost explorative activities by 
the increasing competition from the newfound unit in the other European country. It then was 
stated at board meetings that more fundamental research was needed to catch up with the 
competition  and  new  visions  on  innovation  were  developed  in  a  project  called  “turning  blades”.  
A lot of time had been invested in improving the documentation system including manuals, 
tolerances, time control systems and training and new attempts were made to boost exploration: 
 
“We  labeled  engineers  “R&D”  to  make  them  focus  on  research  projects” 
 
However, these attempts failed because of a lack of redundancy of expertise. Engineers that were 
supposed to focus on research could not detach themselves from day-to-day problem-solving 
activities because they were needed for running business. In the materials group, two persons 
were  appointed  as  “champions”.  They  had   to   analyze   the   stream  of  support   requests,   and   then  
direct them to the group members in a way that those who had to do research did not become 
overwhelmed by new problem-solving activities. This initiative did also not work out well:  
 
“We  came  to  the  conclusion  that  we  needed  all  of  our  resources  to  handle  the  support  
requests.  Actually,  we  even  needed  more”. 
 
The capacity of available workforce did not grow in the same pace as the production of blades 
and the problems stemming from it. Interviewees emphasized that the huge amount of problems 
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that had to be solved, worsened the working atmosphere. Some even had to call in sick, burned-
out. 
 
“If  you  take  a  look  at  how  bad  the  atmosphere  is,  it  is  surprising  so  few  people  leave.  
Dealing with a web of problems without having a standardized problem solving 
approach  is  very  stressful.” 
 
Interviewees explained that based on workload calculations, there was time available for 
explorative activities, such as writing research reports on new materials. However, in practice 
these slack hours could hardly be employed for those activities as they were scattered over the 
whole week. This fragmented way of working gave employees a lot of stress and made them less 
productive. As one informant illustrates: 
 
“Sometimes  I  just  stared  at  my  computer  screen  for  hours,  doing  nothing.” 
 
Exploration recovery 
Around week 80, the level of detail in manuals and reliability of knowledge transfer processes to 
the production facilities had significantly been improved. The organization had become more 
efficient in dealing with non-conformity and root cause analysis requests by designing strict 
procedures about how to deal with them. This made it easier for engineers to plan their activities 
as tasks became more defined and better coordinated by project managers that took care of the 
flow of activities between departments involved. Whereas engineers first were drowning in 
replying flooding e-mailboxes, they now could plan a part of the day to work on longer-term 
projects. As a result, slack resources that at first were absorbed by inefficient processing of 
problem-solving activities that were scattered over a working day now became more streamlined, 
unabsorbed and available for exploration.  
 
Also   the   amount   of   these   requests   decreased   as   the   mother   company’s   sales   dropped   and  
customers reported fewer problems. The company had learned that a lot of time had been 
invested in searching for causes of unique problems that in the end could not be solved. They 
also found new bays to deal more efficiently with support requests and in addition they decided 
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not to hunt for solutions to every little problem anymore and focus on problems that occurred on 
larger scale and for which problem solving efforts would be well invested.  
 
The new separate unit in another European country, where engineers could experiment with new 
technologies, without the constraints of running business activities, had grown steadily up to 20 
FTE. This unit was primarily built up in order to attract wind energy know-how to the company. 
In comparison with the unit in the Netherlands, they had the unique opportunity to solely explore 
and work on new ideas for the future. However, soon the R&D director of the new unit wanted to 
make their expertise more relevant by implementing it. They then became involved in a growing 
number of running projects that ran in The Netherlands. As one of our interviewees illustrated:  
 
“I  think  the  R&D  director  wanted  a  complete  blade  design  site  for  his  own”.   
 
This way, the R&D unit in another European country acted as an expansion vessel for the 
overheated problem solving activities of the focal company. They released the pressure by taking 
over some of the day-today-activities. This created some slack in the engineering departments of 
our focal company.   
 
The sense of urgency to start developments for a new type of wind blade increased. The mother 
company then concurred with start-up of development activities for a new generation of sleeker 
wind blades with a different aerodynamic profile. These developments pursued a sophistication 
level comparable to more technology leading competitors and would include the implementation 
of ideas about new blade structures and approaches to aerodynamics that they had not dared to 
work on before.  
 
ANALYSIS 
To further analyze the decline and recovery of exploration in this organization we focus on the 
four antecedents identified in literature, viz. slack resources, organizational structure, tenure, and 
cognitive style. The first factor is the availability of slack resources. In our case, we observed 
that the organization gained more slack resources while growing. Initially this did not have a 
positive effect on exploration as the increase of slack was not ready to be deployed for 
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exploratory activities, as it was tied to current operations. Only when exploitative activities 
became more formal and efficient, by implementing strict procedures and guidelines, slack was 
deployed for exploration. So not slack as such, but only un-absorbed slack has a shown positive 
influence on exploration levels. The process of de-absorbing is related to the second antecedent, 
organizational structure. 
 
The  organizational  structure  of  our  case  seemed  to  evolve  with  the  stages  of  the  main  product’s  
life cycle. In the initiation stage, which showed high levels of explorative activity, the 
organizational structure was quite organic, characterized by a lack of job and task descriptions, 
low formalization and no centralization of autonomy. When sales of the mother company began 
to grow rapidly, the R&D organization was encouraged to build further on existing products 
along already known technological trajectories. This was facilitated by a somewhat halfhearted 
shift from an organic to a more mechanistic mode of organizing. Specialized departments were 
built around core disciplines, levels of hierarchy and job descriptions were introduced, as well as 
standard operating procedures and guidelines. However, these were not implemented well 
enough to increase efficiency and create unabsorbed slack. After a period of implementing and 
exploiting existing products and technologies, management intended to recover explorative 
activities. The mechanistic mode, however, seemed to be a hampering factor for exploration 
because it created boundaries between the departments hindering cross-functional flow of 
information.  
 
The introduction of parallel project structures then helped to increase communication between 
the separate disciplines and stimulated the recovery of explorative activities. Next to our focal 
unit, a physically separated unit for explorative activities had been developed. It was first 
intended that the initial unit continued its main focus on exploitation, whereas the new unit 
should focus on explorative activities exclusively. However, this structural approach had an 
unexpected effect on exploration and exploitation in both units. The new explorative unit 
gradually moved from exploring technologies to developing products and implementing them as 
its local management wanted to create stronger dependencies and produce visible results for the 
mother company. Also, in our focal unit, this new unit was regarded as internal competition and 
threatening its own business. Although the structure was created to facilitate the Dutch 
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organization to mainly focus on exploitative activities, exploration received increasing attention. 
Our study shows that structuration and formalization, which seems inherent to organizational 
growth, has a negative, but also a positive impact on the level of exploration as it de-absorbs 
slack that can be redeployed for explorative activities. Furthermore, this case demonstrates that 
in situations of fairly autonomous R&D organizations, the creation of a separate unit for 
exploration may lead to increased internal competition, and to a recovery of exploration in the 
unit focusing on exploitation. 
 
The individual antecedents we studied are the cognitive style and tenure of the employees. In 
growing organizations that skew toward efficiency and increased formalization, work 
environments might become less motivating for individuals that tend to prefer an intuitive 
thinking style. In our case we observed that many of the intuitive, entrepreneurial engineers that 
initiated the first product lines in the organic phase of the organization, left the company when 
the organizational mode became more mechanistic and formalized. The effect was twofold. First, 
an important driving force for innovation went away which could have been deployed for 
exploration. Second, their tacit knowledge about the products they developed left the company, 
which made exploitation less efficient and requiring resources that were intended for exploration. 
 
In our case of a fast growing company, we observed negative effects of low levels of mean 
tenure and company experience. Our results suggest that when an organization transitions from a 
phase of exploration and initiation of new products to a phase where focus lies on developing 
along existing trajectories, experienced employees are needed for efficient exploitation of 
existing knowledge. In our case, as a result of the leave of experienced engineers, mean tenure 
and experience among employees was insufficient to deal with exploitative tasks in an effective 
way. Engineers who were supposed to focus on exploration therefore had to help out others 
focusing on exploitation, which negatively impacted exploration levels. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The   aim   of   this   study   was   to   explore   a   company’s   evolution   of   exploration   levels   and   the  
relationships between structural and individual factors that influence these dynamics. In order to 
provide such a longitudinal perspective, we developed a novel method based on project 
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descriptions and time-accounting data to assess the relative importance of exploration and 
exploitation over time. This method proved to create an accurate reconstruction of how 
exploration levels varied over time. The evolution of exploration levels that were measured 
indicated that the focal company, after a period of high levels of exploration, experienced a 
decline of exploration afterwards. It also showed that, facing the danger of a competence trap, 
the company succeeded at recovering exploration activities. We identified several structural and 
individual attributes that contributed to the emergence of these exploration dynamics. 
 
In this section we discuss the main theoretical contributions of our findings and point to the main 
managerial implications. In particular, we provide suggestions to managers of R&D 
organizations and growing R&D organizations in specific on how to evaluate and influence 
exploration levels. Finally we discuss the main limitations of this study and point out to 
interesting avenues for future research. 
 
Interaction between formalization and slack resources for exploration 
Formalization is expected to constrain exploration and facilitate exploitation via incremental 
improvements in processes and products (Lavie et al., 2010). It refers to the degree to which jobs 
are codified (Hage and Aiken, 1970) and like bureaucracy (Thompson, 1965), it is usually 
predicted to be inversely related to innovation (Slappendel, 1996). Worse, there is evidence that 
exploitation-oriented  problem  solving  practices  diminish  an  individual’s  ability  to  explore  (Adler  
et al., 2009).  
 
Challenging this research, we find that focusing on process improvement may not always harm 
exploration. The results of the present study paradoxically indicate that developing efficient 
formalized procedures for exploitation also has a positive effect on exploration. This is related to 
the interaction between formalization and the availability of unabsorbed slack human resources. 
 
As companies grow, they often attain access to resources that are in excess of the minimum 
necessary to produce a certain level of output (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). Slack facilitates risk-
taking and innovation by buffering organizations from environmental fluctuations and downside 
risk, and thus legitimize experimentation (Greve, 2007; Sharfman et al., 1988; Singh, 1986). 
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According to Voss et al. (2008), more human resource slack does not necessarily lead to more 
exploration. It might depend on the degree to which human slack is absorbed or unabsorbed in 
nature. Human resource slack refers to specialized and skilled human resources that are rare and 
absorbed (Mishina et al., 2004). Human resource slack is absorbed because the resources are tied 
up   in   the   organization’s   current   operations.   The   absorbed   nature   of   human   resource   slack  
therefore has a negative influence on exploration and a positive influence on exploitation.  
 
Our study shows that human resource slack can be de-absorbed by having efficient formalized 
procedures in place. Slack human resources, which are non-redundant and absorbed can only be 
de-absorbed and employed for exploration when individuals are not continuously challenged to 
shift between both types of activities, especially when exploration is not constantly interrupted 
by exploitative tasks asking for prioritization. Only when exploitative activities can be isolated, 
for instance by confining them to specific days or working hours, individuals will be able to shift 
their attention to exploration and work on long term projects on the other days. Efficient 
procedures, like standard procedures for prioritization of problem solving requests can help to 
achieve this. Procedures for running business and problem solving activities should be designed 
in a way that individuals do not constantly have to switch between exploration and exploitation 
(which   they   can’t)   but   switch   fewer times and with longer intervals. Given the continuous 
relationship between the amount of exploration and exploitation activities within single business 
units (Gupta et al., 2006), efficient exploitation creates time for exploration. 
 
Interaction between formalization and individual antecedents 
Furthermore this study illuminates the interaction between formalization and individual 
antecedents for exploration. Individual attributes that are time related have an impact on 
exploration. Age and tenure, for instance, have been found to negatively impact individual 
explorative behavior (Scott and Bruce, 1994). Also in groups, the time factor seems to have a 
negative impact on exploration among individuals (Katz, 1982). 
 
According to the contingency theory developed by Zaltman et al. (1973), structural variables will 
be contingent upon the two main stages of the innovation process. An organic structure seems to 
be required for the initiation of innovations, whereas implementation may be best supported by a 
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mechanistic structure (Zaltman et al. 1973). The tendency of aging personnel to stick to 
trajectories already known, fits with the stages of the innovation process shifting from an organic 
to a more mechanistic organizational mode over time. However, when the organization attempts 
to transition to a new initiation phase of a new innovation life cycle, the human resources 
available might not be the ones required for exploration.  
 
Our study showed that people that were the idea generators at the beginning, who built the 
fundaments for the product that would be exploited in the following years, did not develop 
alongside the phases of the product life cycle and did not match with the organizational mode 
which became more mechanistic, and left the company to start their own new businesses. The 
engineers who intuitively built the initial designs should have been kept to transfer their tacit, 
sticky knowledge for efficient exploitation and for the next round, the next product life cycle. 
Our study indicates that not only should mechanistic and organic organizational modes be 
aligned with the product life cycle phase, but also human resources should be aligned with the 
product life cycle and pro-actively be managed when a new product life cycle is to be initiated. 
This implies that the real innovators at the beginning of the cycle should be treasured as chances 
are high they might be intrinsically motivated and skilled to ignite subsequent life cycles of new 
products.  
 
Limitations and future research 
As our study was based on one single case, no general conclusions can be drawn about the 
relationships between structural and individual factors that we explored. Future studies might 
adopt our method to measure exploration dynamics in multiple organizations and compare 
results in order to find out whether the relationships we identified can be generalized to a larger 
population. These studies may also include a broader set of organizational factors. Although we 
have investigated important structural and individual factors that influence exploration within 
organizational boundaries, the role of other factors such as the strategic intent of the mother 
company deserves further investigation. 
 
In addition, we see three important ways in which our method can be improved for future 
research. First, inter-rating scores and interviews demonstrated that our word-counting method 
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was quite accurate in re-creating the evolution of exploration and exploitation. However, the 
project descriptions we used were made at the very beginning of the project; they did not 
necessarily  reflect  the  actual  content  of  the  projects  as  the  projects’  scope  can  change  over  time  
and deviate from the initial project description. Future studies on exploration fluctuations within 
firms might consider incorporating multiple sources of project documentation, such as minutes 
of meetings and evaluation reports. 
 
Second, the project descriptions that were used in our analysis served various purposes. In the 
first place they were written for internal communication about projects and in order to receive 
budget for new plans. However, some of them were also made to acquire government subsidy. 
This might have had impact on the wording and the extent to which they describe the actual 
content of the project. In order to obtain technology subsidies, for example, project descriptions 
might have had a stronger innovative character than the projects actually had when they were 
conducted. Following studies that adopt our method of text analysis might pay attention to the 
uniformity of project description purposes in order to improve the accurateness of project 
classification into explorative and exploitative projects. 
 
Third, the underlying motivation of the exploration and exploitation debate is that they are of 
critical importance to  sustained  performance  of  the  firm.  March’s  belief  is  that  firms  that  have  a  
single-sided focus on either exploration or exploitation will suffer from never gaining the returns 
of new knowledge, or from offering obsolete products in the market. In this study we examined 
changes of exploration and exploitation activity levels, neglecting the impact of these activity 
levels   on   the   firm’s   financial   performance.   This  was   not   possible   because   our   focal   company  
engineers only a part of a product that is sold in the market, which makes the relationship 
between   the   firm’s  products and profit and sales rather difficult to investigate. Future research 
may investigate the relationship between exploration and exploitation activity levels and 
financial performance generated by these efforts. 
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6 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis we investigated the effects of cognitive and structural factors in NPD on multiple 
levels, taking into account the multi-dimensionality of innovation. Below, we summarize the 
main findings and contributions of each study (also see table 1) and conclude with interesting 
avenues for future research. 
 
Ch. 2: To what extent do cognitive styles of CEOs influence exploration and exploitation?  
In this study we explored the link between CEOs' cognitive style and firms' ability to explore 
new products and technologies as well as to exploit existing ones. We provided a richer 
understanding of exploration and exploitation within firms, acknowledging the relevance of the 
cognitive style of senior executives in explaining differences in innovation behavior and their 
effects   on   choices   between   investing   in   explorative   and   exploitative   innovation   and   firms’  
incremental and radical innovation performance. With this study, we contribute to integrating 
insights from upper-echelon theory in research on new product innovation. The upper echelon 
approach views strategic choice as a function of the demographic and psychological composition 
of top managers and suggests several factors that impact the strategic direction and performance 
levels of a firm, such as age, functional backgrounds, other career experiences, education, 
socioeconomic roots and financial position (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Because of the 
difficulties in studying the mental representations and other psychological characteristics of the 
organization’s  executive  members,  Hambrick  and  Mason  (1984)  advocated  indirect  methods  of  
cognitive  assessment,  whereby  executives’  background  characteristics  (e.g. education, functional 
specialization) are used as proxies for cognitive variables in the prediction of organizational 
outcomes (Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008). Using a direct method to assess cognitive style of 
CEOs, our study supports the view that strategic decision-making is influenced by the cognitive 
base of top managers. In particular, our findings show how cognitive characteristics and 
individual inclinations for explorative and exploitative activities influence strategic decision-
making on allocating   resources   to   exploration   and   exploitation   and   firms’   product   innovation  
performance. Previous studies already pointed to the important role of senior managers in 
organizations’   decisions   between   investing   in   exploration   and   exploitation.   Our   study  
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emphasizes the relevance of upper echelon theory in explaining some of the antecedents of these 
strategic decisions. 
 
Ch. 3: To what extent do cognitive styles in teams influence exploration and exploitation?  
In this study, we explored relationships between cognitive styles in NPD teams and project 
performance in different innovation settings. The results of our analyses point at the relevance of 
psychological factors that have received little attention in the NPD literature. In particular, our 
data suggest that team cognitive styles have significant predictive value in explaining project 
performance. Our analyses of the impact of analytical and intuitive thinking styles on 
performance indicate that organizations might benefit from composing teams not only based on 
functional backgrounds, but also based on thinking styles of team members. These findings are 
relevant to management of NPD as we found evidence that the effectiveness of thinking styles in 
teams is contingent on the explorative degree of project activities. This implies that teams can be 
configured in terms of thinking styles for optimal performance of different types of projects. We 
observed that high levels of intuitive processing in NPD teams have significant positive impact 
on overall performance in explorative projects, whereas this thinking style has a significant 
negative impact on project performance in less explorative settings. At the same time, we 
observed that team analytical processing has a positive impact on project performance, 
independent of the explorative degree of the project activities. Our results indicate that the 
effectiveness of NPD teams seems to be contingent on the fit between thinking styles and the 
task of the team. Our findings confirm the points earlier made by Burns and Stalker (1994), who 
argued that different thinking styles might be required to optimize overall performance when 
interacting in organic and mechanistic work environments (Burns and Stalker, 1994). Based on 
our findings and insights, we argue that for optimal overall project performance, managers 
should compose NPD teams with mostly analytical thinkers for their incremental, less 
explorative projects, and compose teams with high-level intuitive and high-level analytical 
thinking for more radical, explorative NPD projects. 
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Ch. 4: To what extent do organizational integration structures influence exploration and 
exploitation?  
With this study, we contributed to a firm-level perspective on the management of NPD 
processes, acknowledging the relevance of structural ambidexterity in organizing NPD. Although 
the structural ambidexterity argument has become increasingly popular in the academic 
literature, our data reveal that the popularity of this strategy among practitioners is rather low. 
Our data show that the majority of our firms preferred a standardized approach concerning their 
integration structure. At the same time, though, our analyses indicate that organizations might 
benefit from adopting structural ambidexterity. We found evidence that the effectiveness of 
integration is different for different kinds of NPD processes. In particular, we observed that, 
adopting a cross-functional integration structure - instead of a functional integration structure - in 
radical NPD processes has a significant positive impact on breakthrough innovation 
performance, whereas the implementation of a cross-functional integration structure in 
incremental NPD processes has a significant negative impact on incremental innovation 
performance. Based on these findings, we argue that firms that manage to apply a cross-
functional integration structure for their radical NPD processes and a functional integration 
structure for their incremental NPD processes will be the most successful in terms of balancing 
derivative and breakthrough innovation performance. As such we derived evidence in favor of 
structural ambidexterity in terms of organizing both types of innovative activity differently. 
 
Ch. 5:  How do structural and cognitive factors influence the evolution of exploration and 
exploitation over time? 
In this case study, we started identifying interactions and connections between structural and 
individual factors. First, this study illuminates the interaction between formalized structures and 
individual antecedents for exploration. In previous studies age and tenure have been found to 
negatively impact individual explorative behavior (Scott and Bruce, 1994). Also in groups, the 
time factor seems to have a negative impact on exploration among individuals (Katz, 1982). 
According to the contingency theory developed by Zaltman et al. (1973), structural variables will 
be contingent upon the two main stages of the innovation process. An organic structure seems to 
be required for the initiation of innovations, whereas implementation may be best supported by a 
mechanistic structure (Zaltman et al. 1973). The tendency of aging personnel to stick to 
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trajectories already known, fits with the stages of the innovation process shifting from an organic 
to a more mechanistic organizational mode over time. However, when the organization attempts 
to transition to a new initiation phase of a new innovation life cycle, the human resources 
available might not be the ones required for exploration. Our study showed that people that were 
the idea generators at the beginning, who built the fundaments for the product that would be 
exploited in the following years, did not develop alongside the phases of the product life cycle 
and did not match with the organizational mode which became more mechanistic, and left the 
company to start their own new businesses. The engineers who intuitively built the initial designs 
should have been kept to transfer their tacit, sticky knowledge for efficient exploitation and for 
the next round, the next product life cycle. Our study indicates that not only should mechanistic 
and organic organizational modes be aligned with the product life cycle phase, but also human 
resources should be aligned with the product life cycle and pro-actively be managed when a new 
product life cycle is to be initiated. Secondly, this study illuminates the interaction between 
formalization and the availability of unabsorbed slack human resources for exploration. As 
companies grow, they often attain access to resources that are in excess of the minimum 
necessary to produce a certain level of output (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). Slack facilitates risk-
taking and innovation by buffering organizations from environmental fluctuations and downside 
risk, and thus legitimizes experimentation (Greve, 2007; Sharfman et al., 1988; Singh, 1986). 
According to Voss et al. (2008), more human resource slack does not necessarily lead to more 
exploration. It might depend on the degree to which human slack is absorbed or unabsorbed in 
nature. Our study shows that human slack can be de-absorbed by having efficient formalized 
procedures in place. Slack human resources, which are non-redundant and absorbed can only be 
de-absorbed and employed for exploration when individuals are not continuously challenged to 
shift between both types of activities, especially when exploration is not constantly interrupted 
by exploitative tasks asking for prioritization. Only when exploitative activities can be isolated, 
for instance by confining them to specific days or working hours, individuals will be able to shift 
their attention to exploration and work on long term projects on the other days. Efficient 
procedures, like standard procedures for prioritization of problem solving requests can help to 
achieve this. Procedures for running business and problem solving activities should be designed 
in a way that individuals do not constantly have to switch between exploration and exploitation 
(which   they   can’t)   but   switch   fewer   times   and   with   longer   intervals.   Given   the   continuous  
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relationship between the amount of exploration and exploitation activities within single business 
units (Gupta et al., 2006), efficient exploitation creates time for exploration. 
 
Our studies have several limitations, which are displayed per chapter in table 2. The most 
interesting avenues for future research that these limitations provide will be briefly discussed. 
Research  on   the   effects   of  CEOs’   cognitive   style  on  exploration  and   exploitation  within   firms  
might consider assessing long-term effects of changes in   CEOs’   innovation   behavior.   By  
adopting   a   longitudinal   approach,   insight   into   how   changes   in   CEOs’   innovation   behavior,  
allocation of R&D resources and innovation performance causally relate to each other, could be 
improved. Future studies on the effects of cognitive style in NPD teams might also adopt a time 
lens. Although we were able to examine the degree to which thinking styles were present in NPD 
teams, we have not paid attention to the effects of cognitive style throughout the stages of a 
project. Previous research, however, suggests that the effects of thinking styles may differ 
depending on the stage in the NPD process. It would therefore be relevant for future research to 
provide more fine-grained insights into the performance implications of interactions between 
team members from different functional backgrounds and their thinking styles in different phases 
of the project. Finally, our longitudinal study on the effects of interactions between structural and 
cognitive factors on exploration was based on one single case, which implies that no general 
conclusions can be drawn about the relationships between the structural and individual factors 
that we explored. Future studies might be inspired by our novel method to measure exploration 
dynamics in multiple organizations and compare results in order to further study interactions 
between cognitive and structural factors.  
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Table 1: main findings per chapter 
Chapter Title and topic Findings Related articles 
2 “Exploration  and  
exploitation within 
firms: the impact of 
CEOs’  cognitive  
style on incremental 
and radical 
innovation 
performance” 
 
The impact of 
thinking styles of 
CEOs on the 
balance between 
exploration and 
exploitation. 
The more analytical (intuitive) the 
cognitive style of CEOs, the stronger 
their focus on exploitative 
(explorative) activities. 
 
The degree to which CEOs focus on 
exploitative (explorative) activities is 
positively related to the percentage of 
R&D resources that are allocated to 
exploitative (explorative) activities 
within the firm. 
 
Higher allocation of R&D resources 
to exploitative activities increases 
firms’  incremental  product  
innovation performance; 
 
Higher allocation of R&D resources 
to exploitative activities decreases a 
firms’  radical  product  innovation  
performance. 
 
De Visser, M., Faems, D., Van den 
Top, P., 2011. Exploration and 
exploitation within SMEs: 
connecting the CEO's cognitive 
style to product innovation 
performance. In proceedings of the 
International Product Development 
Management Conference, Delft, 
The Netherlands, June 5-7. 
 
De Visser, M., Faems, D., Van den 
Top, P., 2011. Exploration and 
exploitation within SMEs: 
connecting the CEO's cognitive 
style to product innovation 
performance. Presented at the 
INSCOPE Conference, Enschede, 
The Netherlands, October 12. 
 
3 “Team  composition  
and NPD project 
performance: do 
cognitive styles 
matter?” 
 
The impact of 
cognitive styles in 
teams on NPD 
project 
performance. 
 
NPD team intuitive processing has a 
significant positive impact on overall 
project performance in highly 
explorative settings. 
 
NPD team intuitive processing has a 
significant negative impact on overall 
project performance in less 
explorative settings. 
 
Team analytical processing has a 
significant positive impact on project 
performance, independent of the 
explorative degree of the project 
activities. 
 
De Visser, M., Faems, D., 
Visscher, K., De Weerd-Nederhof, 
P.C., 2013. Team composition and 
NPD performance: do cognitive 
styles matter? To be presented at 
the International Product 
Development Management 
Conference, Paris, France, June 23-
25. 
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Chapter Title and topic Findings Related articles 
4 “Structural  
ambidexterity: a 
firm-level 
assessment of the 
impact of 
differentiated 
integration 
structures on 
innovation 
performance” 
 
The impact of 
(cross-) functional 
structures in 
incremental and 
radical NPD 
processes on 
innovation 
performance. 
The effectiveness of integration is 
different among different kinds of 
NPD processes. 
 
Adopting a cross-functional 
integration structure in radical NPD 
processes has a significant positive 
impact on breakthrough innovation 
performance. 
 
The implementation of a cross-
functional integration structure in 
incremental NPD processes has a 
significant negative impact on 
incremental innovation performance. 
De Visser, M., de Weerd-Nederhof, 
P., Faems, D., Song, M., van Looy, 
B., Visscher, K., 2008. 
Ambidexterity in NPD processes: 
an exploration of performance 
effects of - differentiated - 
organizational practices. Presented 
at the R&D Management 
conference, Ottawa, Canada, June 
17-20. 
 
De Visser, M., de Weerd-Nederhof, 
P., Faems, D., Song, M., Van 
Looy, B., Visscher, K., 2009.  
Structural ambidexterity in NPD 
processes: the impact of 
differentiated integration structures 
on innovation performance. In Best 
Paper Proceedings of the Academy 
of Management Conference, 
Chicago, USA, August 7-11. 
 
De Visser, M., De Weerd-
Nederhof, P., Faems, D., Song, M., 
Van Looy, Visscher, K., 2010. 
Structural ambidexterity in NPD 
processes: The impact of - 
differentiated - structures on firm-
level innovation performance. 
Technovation, 30, 5-6, 291-299. 
 
5 “Gone  with  the  
wind? A 
longitudinal study 
of explorative 
innovation in a 
growing wind 
turbine blade 
technology 
company” 
 
Relationships 
between structural 
and individual 
factors and their 
impact on the 
evolution of a 
firm’s  balance  
between 
exploration and 
exploitation. 
Formalization of exploitative 
activities can de-absorb human slack 
resources, which can be redeployed 
for explorative activities. This way, 
efficient exploitation can have a 
positive effect on the level of 
exploration. 
 
When an organization evolves from 
an organic to a more mechanistic 
mode of organizing along the stages 
of the product life cycle, the work 
environment might become less 
motivating for individuals that tend to 
prefer an intuitive thinking style. 
When these individuals leave the 
company, an important driving force 
for innovation may go away as well 
as their tacit knowledge making 
exploitation less efficient. 
 
De Visser, M.,  Faems, D., 
Visscher, K., De Weerd-Nederhof, 
P.C., 2010. Toward a dynamic 
perspective on explorative and 
exploitative innovation activities: a 
longitudinal study in the wind 
blade industry. In proceedings of 
the International Product 
Development Management 
Conference, Murcia, Spain, June 
13-15. 
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Table 2: limitations per chapter 
  
Chapter Title Limitations 
2 Exploration and 
exploitation within firms: 
the  impact  of  CEOs’  
cognitive style on 
incremental and radical 
innovation performance 
Limited generizability: compared to SMEs, innovation outcomes at larger 
firms  are  often  influenced  by  a  broader  set  of  factors  besides  the  CEO’s  
innovation behavior, such as more complex organizational systems, which 
make strategic decision-making less straightforward. The statistical 
relationships  we  found  between  CEOs’  Cognitive  Style,  CEOs’  Innovation  
Behavior, Allocation of R&D Resources and Innovation Performance may 
not be as strong as what we found with our sample of SMEs. 
 
Cross-sectional data: although we built in time lags between some of our 
variables, we were not able to assess long-term effects of changes in 
CEOs’  innovation  behavior.  Future  studies  may  adopt  a  longitudinal  
approach to increase insight into how changes  in  CEOs’  innovation  
behavior, allocation of R&D resources and innovation performance 
causally relate to each other. 
 
3 Team composition and 
NPD project 
performance: do 
cognitive styles matter? 
 
Unidimensional performance measure: in this study we only examined 
effects on overall project performance. However, project performance is a 
multi-dimensional construct. For a product development team charged 
with designing a specific part of a larger product, several properties may 
be important, such as including functionality, manufacturability and 
dimensional integrity. As analytical and intuitive processing may have 
different effects on these different dimensions of performance, we suggest 
that future studies on thinking styles in NPD teams distinguish between 
more dimensions of project performance. 
 
Cross-sectional data: although we were able to examine the degree to 
which thinking styles were present in NPD teams, we have not paid 
attention to their effects on performance throughout the stages of a project. 
Previous research, however, suggests that the effects of thinking styles 
may differ depending on the stage in the NPD process. For instance, 
individuals with a more intuitive cognitive style may be more effective in 
the initiation phase, whereas those with a more analytical style may be 
better in the implementation phase where ideas come into practice. Also, 
the effects of cognitive style may be dependent on the functional 
background of team members. It would therefore be relevant for future 
research to provide more fine-grained insights into the implications of 
thinking styles of team members with different functional backgrounds in 
different phases of the project. 
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Chapter Title Limitations 
4 Structural ambidexterity: 
a firm-level assessment 
of the impact of 
differentiated integration 
structures on innovation 
performance 
US-only data: previous project-level research already indicated that the 
relationship between integration structures, product innovativeness and 
project performance is influenced by the national culture in which the firm 
is embedded. We therefore encourage researchers to conduct an 
international comparison of the impact of integration structures in different 
kinds of NPD processes on different kinds of innovation performance. 
 
Binary distinction between functional and cross-functional integration 
structures: previous research on individual NPD projects indicates that 
firms can implement different kinds of cross-functional integration 
structures. These studies provide indications that the particular 
composition of cross-functional integration teams might influence project 
performance. Future firm-level research on the relationship between 
integration structures and innovation performance may use more fine-
grained measures for the applied integration structure. 
 
5 Gone with the wind? A 
longitudinal study of 
explorative innovation in 
a growing wind turbine 
blade technology 
company 
Single case study: from this study no general conclusions can be drawn 
about the relationships between the structural and individual factors that 
we explored. Future studies might be inspired by our method to measure 
exploration dynamics in multiple organizations and compare results in 
order to find out whether the relationships we identified can be generalized 
to a larger population. These studies may also include a broader set of 
organizational factors. 
 
No link with financial performance: we examined changes of exploration 
and exploitation activity levels, neglecting the impact of these activity 
levels on the  firm’s  financial  performance.  This  was  not  possible  because  
our focal company engineers only a part of a product that is sold in the 
market,  which  makes  the  relationship  between  the  firm’s  output  end  profit  
and sales rather difficult to investigate. Future research may investigate the 
relationship between exploration and exploitation activity levels and 
financial performance generated by these efforts. 
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